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  i 
Abstract 
This study examines the determinants of chairman compensation in supervisory boards. The 
research is based on a sample of the 30 German DAX firms and focuses on the positive 
relationship of chairman compensation depending on CEO compensation. We investigate upon 
possible cronyism influencing the compensation setting process of chairmen. This paper takes 
a new, reversed approach on the topic, as in previous research the emphasis was on the ability 
of chairmen influencing CEO wages. A regression model is used to analyze causality, identify 
evidence and draw conclusions regarding the influence of increases of CEO compensation on 
chairman compensation. According to our research it can be concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between CEO and chairman compensation. We cannot find a distinct proof of 
cronyism between chairmen and CEOs though. 
Keywords: German Corporate Governance System, Chairman Compensation, Cronyism, 
DAX30, Two-Tier Supervisory Boards. 
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1 Introduction  
‘I’m distancing myself from Martin Winterkorn (Volkswagen CEO)’ 
(Ferdinand Piech, Chairman of the VW supervisory board, 10/04/2015) 
This recent quote was quite a surprise to the public and VW’s stakeholders as the relationship 
between the two managers was supposed to be tight and they shared a long history together in 
the company. Martin Winterkorn was even supposed to replace Piech as the chairman1 of VW’s 
supervisory board after 2017. This tension between a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and a 
chairman is not typical in German firms as it is quite common that former managers become 
chairman of the supervisory board at the end of their career. Usually the media regards the 
relationship of the institutions as close and a constructive working and monitoring environment 
can be recognized. This perception is strengthened, by Mats Isaksson’s (2015) view ’(…) this 
dispute is unusual for German Corporate Governance Systems and doesn’t reflect the common 
relation between chairman and CEO’.2 The institutional role of the supervisory board 
incorporates the appointment of the managers. In the Volkswagen case Ferdinand Piech wanted 
to make use of the ‘Hiring & Firing’ role, when proposing Martin Winterkorn to step down. 
Since 50% of the German supervisory board members are employees and voted in favor of CEO 
Martin Winterkorn, he stayed in his position and finally Ferdinand Piech stepped down from 
his chairman position himself. This unusual outcome puts emphasis on the specialty of German 
board structures and the CEO chairman relationship. 
To introduce another dimension into this relation framework; in the past years CEO 
compensation debates arose internationally and the public eye focused on the relationship 
between CEO and chairmen. Cronyism accuses between the two tiers of the board arose. In this 
paper cronyism can be described as a dependence relation where the actions of the two related 
managers cannot to be regarded as independent anymore. In general, the supervisory board is 
responsible for setting the CEO remuneration. Especially in the sense of the ‘Hiring & Firing’ 
and ‘Say on Pay’ framework ‘mutual back scratching’ between the two is interesting. The 
following study will concentrate on determinants of chairman remuneration on the one hand 
and analyze the cronyism relation and its effects on chairman remuneration on the other hand. 
A previous study by Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014) on the relationship between chairman and 
                                                 
1 If the masculine grammatical form is used in the paper this is due to improved readability issues and statements include the 
female gender as well. 
2 Mats Isakkson, Head of Corporate Affairs at the OECD, was met at the 17th SNEE on 22nd of May 2015. 
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CEO compensation proved the existence of cronyism between the two institutions in Sweden. 
The rationale behind the research idea is that the CEO will reimburse the chairman for its risen 
salary with a raise of the chairman compensation.  
To conduct a study regarding the determinants of chairman compensation and possible 
cronyism the country specifics in the relation and legal origin of the governance system have 
to be taken into consideration. First of all this is due to the fact that the German system is 
diverging from the Anglo-Saxon system and the Mixed Swedish system, where chairman 
duality is allowed. The two-tier board structure is unique compared to other western countries 
through other reasons as well. The board of directors with mainly outside directors is separated 
from the management board and therefore two tiers exist. German companies have been hit by 
corporate scandals and a binding code for public firms was introduced in 2002. This evolvement 
is in line with that of other western countries that reacted to the scandals of the 1990s and early 
2000s. Previous failures in the monitoring role of boards are reasons to set up codes (Oxelheim 
& Clarkson, 2014). In Germany the executive board elects the chairman and suggests chairman 
compensation to the annual general meeting. It is the supervisory board’s duty to approve the 
CEO compensation.  
Second of all, empirical determinants of chairman remuneration in connection with cronyism 
have not been analyzed in Germany. In the USA (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2002), the UK (Chen, 
2014) and Sweden (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014) research has been conducted. The purpose 
of this research is to fill the research gap in Germany. Oxelheim & Clarkson’s (2014) analysis 
provides an econometric framework for orientation, building the point of departure for our study 
(Table A 7: Matrix: Defining the Research Gap). The research is bound to some limitations 
regarding to country, time and restrictions of the econometric model. First of all the outcomes 
are only applicable to the German Large caps listed in the DAX30. Second of all, the period 
under consideration ranges from 2006 to 2014. Going back in time further is not applicable, as 
companies were not obliged to explicitly disclose CEO compensation.  
The outline of the thesis is presented in the following. Section 2 THEORETICAL REVIEW consists 
of a review on theories ascribed to director and chairman compensation. The German Corporate 
Governance System is pictured and the role and tasks of the supervisory board are clarified. 
The section ends with a review on the recent research topics on determinants of chairman 
remuneration. In section 3 METHODOLOGY our hypotheses are stated and the research approach 
and design inclusive data collection and econometric model is presented. Chapter 4 
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION is dedicated to the analysis of results, discussion and 
robustness analysis. In chapter 5 CONCLUSION a summary of the findings and policy and future 
research implications are given.   
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2 Theoretical Review 
2.1 Corporate Governance & Supervisory Board 
Structures 
In the past years ‘Corporate Governance’ has become a fashionable buzzword and is often used 
in media when corporate scandals or compensation issues are discussed, many times without 
empirical evidence and in combination with weak polemic arguments. From a scientifically 
perspective corporate governance, arising from the conflict between the separation of 
ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932), can be classified into different fields of business 
administration and economics. In this study, the concept of corporate governance is regarded 
as a field of finance. This is in line with Shleifer & Vishny’s (1997:737) classification of 
corporate governance and the risk perspective, where ‘corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment’. Furthermore, this is mainly influenced by the type of empirical study 
conducted and inspired by the research field of the advising professor Lars Oxelheim. The board 
of directors is one of the main formal corporate governance mechanisms and its functions within 
the corporate governance system differ a lot among the legal origins (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008) and countries. In the following, the two main common board 
structures and their characteristics are discussed in order to draw a comparison between the 
German and the Swedish system. 
2.1.1 Outsider System 
The Anglo-American board is a one-tier system and the board consists of the management and 
non-executive directors. The system has spread from the UK to former British colonies like the 
USA and New Zealand (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). The system is 
characterized as follows: the investors are provided with a high degree of protection, mainly 
institutional investors are present, dispersed ownership (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 2000), no employees on the board, low bank influence and the possibility of 
chairman duality. It is described as an Outsider System because the corporate governance 
mechanisms from outside, in other words the market, are determining (Andreas, 2011). The 
Anglo-American system developed departing from the common law system, which stands for 
a social control that seeks to support private market outcomes and solutions. Other systems are 
mainly influenced by the French civil law, which has a state-desired allocation and policy 
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implementing approach (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Typical for the Anglo-
American shaped system is furthermore a one-tier board, where control and management 
functions are not separated (Andreas, 2011). 
2.1.2 Insider System 
The Insider System, as prevalent in Germany, is influenced by the civil and common law. It can 
be described as a hybrid of the two main legal origin systems. The corporate governance 
mechanisms are influenced by commercial banks and chairman duality is not possible, whereas 
codetermination of employees plays an important role. Often large block holders are prevalent 
so there is a strong incentive to monitor the management decisions. Because the influence of 
the investors and capital markets is lower compared to the Anglo-American system, the ‘inside’ 
corporate governance instruments are of a more crucial role (Andreas, 2011). The two-tier 
board structure in Germany with a separation of bodies into executive and supervisory board is 
viewed from a critical perspective in regards to a close communication between the directors, 
which is easier in the Anglo-American board structure. Deviating from the classical Insider 
System, the Swedish Corporate Governance System is called ‘Mixed System’ (Heindrick & 
Struggles, 2009) and allows for an executive member on the supervisory board (Swedish 
Corporate Governance Board, 2010). The likelihood of chairman duality is, although not 
specifically forbidden relatively unlikely (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). Codetermination can 
make up 1/3 of the board (Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 2010) and block- & family 
ownership is also shaping such as the strong stakeholder focus and extraordinary transparency 
towards them (Heindrick & Struggles, 2009).  
2.1.3 Types of Directors 
One cannot only distinguish between the different board systems but also between different 
kinds of directors. Primarily a differentiation can be done between outside and inside directors. 
Inside directors are mostly executives. In a common law and one-tier determined system inside 
directors are employed frequently. Sometimes a lead director is determined to prevent chairman 
duality in the sense that another director but the CEO is leading the joint board meetings. 
Outside directors are defined as directors, which are currently not working on the management 
board but are also not completely independent. So a former executive who retired a few years 
ago and is now entering a board can be an outside director, whereas an independent director 
didn’t have a relation with the firm before (Oxelheim, 2014)3. Directors can be non-independent 
                                                 
3 Strategic Corporate Finance Lecture by Lars Oxelheim on 18th November 2014. 
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and have other dependency relations, which can also influence their actions. This might result 
in activities not in line with the predefined role of the directors (2.2 ROLE OF SUPERVISORY 
BOARD) and the originally defined responsibilities.  
2.1.4 Dependence Relations 
Dependence relations can be regarded from an agency theory perspective, where possible 
conflicts of interest can be detected. One of the main dependence relations is a non-independent 
director, who can be identified by having business or personal relations, which can create a 
conflict of interest at the expense of the monitoring function (Regierungskommission, 2014; 
Hutzenreuter, Metten, & Weigland, 2012; Andreas, 2011). Conflicts of interest can arise due to 
internal and external issues. They can arise during the work on the board or also exist already 
at the time of appointment. (Hutzenreuter, Metten, & Weigland, 2012). Employee 
representatives on boards can usually be regarded as independent (Bartz & von Werder, 2014). 
This independency is often discussed by pointing out the limited efficiency of control though. 
Many other interdependencies can be identified. Directors can be interrelated with other boards 
in the industry or to the financial industry. One of the strongest forms is the ’interlock’ situation, 
where one manager is on the board of another firm and vice versa. These situations can be on 
the one hand seen as an advantage from the resource dependency theory perspective (2.2.3 
INSTITUTIONAL ROLE –RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY), which regards the network as a 
competitive advantage (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010). On the other hand, these interrelations 
can be seen as a disadvantage from an agency theory perspective because the costs of 
monitoring of the non-independent manager are higher (2.2.1 CONTROL ROLE – AGENCY 
THEORY). These interrelations and dependence relations can exist in extreme forms and can 
also lead to cronyism shaped actions. 
2.1.5 Cronyism 
One dependency relation could i.e. exist between a former CEO, who is the chairman of the 
supervisory board nowadays and a former colleague, who is the CEO today. Often, when people 
work together a long-term friendship and loyalty develops. The two cannot to be assumed as 
independent anymore. Sometimes even cronyism can be assumed. Cronyism in this thesis is 
defined by a through close social contact characterized business relation. So benefits are taken 
and the relation as originally defined by the company’s constitution is deviating. Cronyism 
between CEOs and chairmen can exist and in the past evidence was found that ‘mutual back 
scratching’ or ‘cronyism’ can result in excessive compensation of both parties (Brick, Palmon, 
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& Wald, 2005). Here the degree of possible cronyism within the relation between the appointer 
and beneficiary depends on the corporate governance system. The dependencies of the two can 
influence the role and tasks of the two institutional bodies. 
2.2 Role of Supervisory Board 
2.2.1 Control Role – Agency Theory 
Three major roles and functions of the supervisory board are identified, which are monitoring, 
advisory and human resource (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). 
Generally, the agency theory is determining this research framework and represents the central 
theory of the role of the supervisory board. It describes a situation where one party, the 
principal, delegates and pays another party, the agent, to work and take actions on its behalf. 
The principle in general faces the problem that he cannot observe if the actions of the agent are 
taken in his interests or if the agent has diverging interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For 
nowadays-conducted research, agency theory, categorized as a part of New Institutional 
Economic Theory, builds a major skeleton. The shareholders, principles in this case, appoint 
the management as agents to pursue firm value maximization (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this 
structure, with a certain information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970) and diverging interests 
existing, the board of directors is a corporate governance mechanism to aid the shareholders, 
letting the agent pursue actions in their interest. Typical utilization actions by the agent are 
‘Empire Building’, ‘Shirking’ and ‘Consumption on the Job’ (Andreas, 2011:31). This should 
in consequence be inhibited by a contract to overcome moral hazard. This introduces the control 
role of the supervisory board (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The board is obliged to do a kind of co-
auditing, besides the auditing company, to evaluate financials and figures reported. From the 
pictured situation a double agency dilemma arises, where the board of directors (agents) is 
originally appointed to monitor the interests of the shareholders (principles). The supervisory 
board also acts as a principle to the management board (Clarke, 2007). According to Stiles & 
Taylor (2001:68) non-executive directors and independent directors are advantageous as 
controlling bodies due to a higher degree of independence. With regards to agency theory two 
mechanisms are mentioned to exercise control over the agent: ‘Monitoring’ and ’Incentive 
Contracts’ (Andreas, 2011:33) in form of remuneration. Both agents, the executive board, but 
also the supervisory board got compensated to incentivize them to pursue the obligations and 
demanded duties. Optimal contracting theory is one element of the agency theory. It solves 
the information asymmetry issue and puts a contract into the relation thereby preventing 
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exploitation by the agent (Bebschuk & Fried, 2003). This is done with the goal of minimizing 
agency costs for the shareholders (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010). Contracts can be a 
possibility to align interests, but when they are negotiated one has to keep in mind that 
according to the arm’s length hypothesis both contracting sides are aiming for the best deal. 
‘Hence, director compensation is presumed to be the result of a bargaining process between 
shareholders and directors, (…)’ (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010:4). Later it will be discussed 
how contracts and rewards in form of remuneration are shaped and established in Germany (2.3 
SUPERVISORY BOARD REMUNERATION).  
2.2.2 Strategic Role – Stewardship theory 
The division of labor among the boards implicates that the executive board is dealing with the 
day-to-day business whereas the supervisory board deals with the monitoring. The strategy and 
advisory role of the supervisory board is in a greyish area in which both work together. The 
supervisory board is also the guard to keep the vision and mission determined prior by the 
management (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Davis & Donaldson (1991) argue contrary to the agency 
theory in what they call stewardship theory, and the assumption that everyone acts selfish. In 
their research they propose that managers are stewards, which are likely to have a ‘natural 
motivation’ (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010:4) to care for their duties and fulfill their tasks in 
accordance with their principals. They are not acting in a self-serving nature but have a more 
holistic approach towards the whole organization. As a main trigger one can determine the 
strong belief that everything contributed to the organization will be rewarded in the future i.e. 
in the form of pension payments or career benefits. According to Davis et al. (1997) the power 
of the manager will not be abused but used to act in favor of the organization. This can also be 
derived in the direction of supervisory boards, also applicable with chairman duality. The 
supervisory board is therefore acting in behalf of the firm and is monitoring that the overall 
strategy is kept and decisions by the management don’t depart but are aligned with the original 
orientation and shareholders’ interests. 
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2.2.3 Institutional Role – Resource Dependency Theory 
The board of directors is responsible to provide the organization with critical resources, 
especially in the sense of a network and external relations. According to Stiles & Taylor (2001) 
this incorporates relationships with shareholders and also other stakeholder groups and the 
access to the fundamental and scarce resources. These can be i.e. information, legal know-how 
and contracting knowledge. As main examples for this so called resource dependency theory 
one can name the network in regards to the influence on banks and ability to improve capital 
acquirements. Furthermore the network is helpful to recruit and appoint new executive 
managers. The human resource responsibility including ‘Hiring & Firing of the CEO’ and 
setting the CEO salary is regarded as part of the institutional role as well. The board is also 
representing the company to the external environment and very important for investor relations. 
Finally one has to admit, although the stewardship explain the role of the supervisory board 
well, the agency perspective is dominant in accessing the role of the supervisory board and its 
remuneration.  
2.3 Supervisory Board Remuneration 
2.3.1 Principles & Elements of Compensation  
In line with the agency theory, remuneration can be used as an incentive mechanism to let the 
agent act in the interest of the principal. The payments are part of aligning interests and 
preventing self- utilization, as described above. Stimuli or variable compensation can build an 
element to extend motivation and pursuing the goals of the principles. Variable compensation 
can exist in form of attendance fees, committee work, function related payment for taking on a 
certain positions i.e. head of a committee. There can even be separate advisory contracts of the 
directors for advising the company. The remuneration constitutes a cost for the shareholders 
(Andreas, 2011). Incentives are part of the adverse selection problem, where the agent, the 
managers, might have hidden knowledge. In this framework the supervisory board is 
remunerated to avoid actions in their own interest with exclusive knowledge that is not in the 
best interest of the shareholders. But this argument is not setting the basic remuneration. First 
of all the payment shall represent compensation for the time spent, which could be spend also 
on a comparable tasks. This is called expense allowance in form of fixed compensation. 
Furthermore, it should be an inducement for the demand in scare resource of potential 
supervisory board candidates. In regards to its peers, every company wants to have the best 
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board members on its supervisory board. As Andreas (2011) describes, remuneration can either 
be set according to input, to increase motivation to perform well, or output, which is not valuing 
the intensity of work but final outcomes. In accordance with the before mentioned optimal 
contracting theory, one can add here that the incentives to achieve goal alignment should 
increase until there are diminishing marginal effects (Andreas, 2011). To create an efficient 
system, fixed and variable remuneration elements are set (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 
1996). Opinions about an optimal remuneration system diverge, where Hahn & Lasfer (2010) 
and Davis et al. (1997) support agency theory and argue that performance-based elements favor 
overall shareholder interests.  
Whereas stewardship theory would predict motivation is also driven with fixed compensation 
packages (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010). Regarding the resource dependency theory one 
would pay a higher remuneration according to the personal network and amount of 
interrelations and interlocks a directors holds (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010).  
In contrast to the agency theory, Bebchuk & Fried (2006) support the managerial power 
theory and argue that performance oriented payments do not solve the issue of agency 
problems; moreover they enhance and create the problems. According to the arms lengths 
hypothesis, every person has the aim to create contracts in their favor. Research proposes that 
in a company’s setting managers are able to use their power in the pay setting process thereby 
getting compensation relatively higher to their performance. According to this theory 
shareholders can get exploited by chairmen receiving ‘pay without performance’. In the 
traditional CEO compensation debates this theory is a major argument and according to 
Clarkson & Olsson (2010) chairman duality enables ‘rent extraction’ by both boards. Clarkson 
& Olsson argue that according to the managerial power theory ‘self-dealing’ develops where 
both boards agree upon increasing the compensation levels of each other without additional 
performance, which can be identified as a mechanism of cronyism.  
The tournament theory was developed (Lazear & Rosen, 1981) when analyzing incentive 
schemes and compensation in firms. Its findings propose that managers focus on hierarchy and 
rankings and are incentivized by next higher levels. The by Gregory-Smith (2009) conducted 
study in the UK also find evidence for this theory in the context of director compensation and 
goes even further with identifying that ‘losing’ managers tend to leave because they were 
striving for the better. The research conducted concentrated on the directors of a one-tier board 
though; which leads over to the special setting of a two-tier system. 
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2.3.2 Two-Tier Agency Theory Model 
The traditional agency model sets a framework in which compensation is set according to the 
task the principle is delegating to the agent. The German agency model differs somewhat from 
the traditional model. One can identify one principle, the shareholders, and two agents, 
management board and supervisory board (Seele, 2007; Andreas, 2011). So two agency 
relationships exist: First the primary principles, the shareholders, delegate the monitoring task 
to their agent, the supervisory board and set the compensation for it in the annual general 
meeting. Second, the supervisory board acts as a principle itself, monitors the active 
management and sets the compensation for the executive board (Koch & Stadtmann, 2013). 
The main remuneration theories explained above can also be applied to the two-tier agency 
model. Referring to Andreas et al. (2010) one can apply agency theory and argue that the two-
tier structure creates higher information asymmetry between the directors, this makes 
monitoring tougher and therefore incentive contracts seem to be a reasonable solution. From 
the stewardship perspective then again the two-tier structure enforces the monitoring role of the 
supervisory board and facilitates being ‘(…) better stewards of the firm’s assets than self-
serving agents’ (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010:1). This strengthens non-incentive based 
payment structures. So there are various elements of compensation identified according to the 
different theories and also different processes how the remuneration is set. Differences between 
countries and more specifics on Germany will be given in the following:  
2.4 German Corporate Governance System 
2.4.1 Legal Framework 
The very complex appearing framework for institutional governance mechanisms in companies 
in Germany is based on the following laws: ‘German Stock Corporation Law’ Aktiengesetz 
(AktG), Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTaG, 1998), 
Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zur Transparenz und Publizität (TransPuG, 2002), 
Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz (BilReG, 2004), Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und 
Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG, 2005), Vorstandsvergütungs-
Offenlegungsgesetz (VorstOG, 2005), ‘German Accounting Law Modernization Act’ Gesetz 
zur Modernisierung des Bilanzrechts (BilMoG, 2009) and finally the Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex or German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), which was set into force 
in 2002 and can be described as a mixture of containing a summary of the legal obligations for 
companies and soft law with recommendations. The code is checked and revised once a year 
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by the government commission on corporate governance (Regierungskommission, 2014). In 
general one can say that the German Corporate Governance System pursues the main guidelines 
and directions of the OECD principles (OECD, 2011). 
2.4.2 Characteristics 
Originally corporate governance discussion started off in the US, when shareholder demanded 
a more efficient monitoring process. Since the 1990’s the role and tasks of the supervisory board 
were also subject to a reformation process (Berrar, 2001). In the past years the abilities of the 
supervisory board members were questioned in regard to efficiently fulfilling the complex 
monitoring tasks (Andreas, 2011). These discussions lead to a change of the coherent German 
Corporate Governance System also. According to the previously described Outsider and Insider 
System (2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & SUPERVISORY BOARD STRUCTURE), the German 
system can be clearly categorized into the latter (Heindrick & Struggles, 2009), where no 
members of the executive board are allowed to serve on the supervisory board. From a global 
perspective the German system can be regarded as a prototype of the before explained 
‘Germanic’ Insider System (Andreas, 2011). Through §76 Abs.1 AktG the executive board is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. And according to §105 Abs.1 
AktG chair duality is prohibited (Bundesministerium der Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 1965). 
According to Heindrick & Struggles Corporate Governance Report (2009) in 84% of all 
European countries the function is split. AktG §111 Abs. 1 determines the task of the 
supervisory board: monitoring of the management in the superordinate interests and direction 
of business (Bundesministerium der Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 1965). As Koch and 
Stadtmann (2013:56) state the supervisory board ‘(…) is not in charge of the company’s active 
management, but supervises the company’s strategic decisions.’ This clear separation of the 
executives in regard to their duties makes the German system a perfect example for an Insider 
System. Further details of the supervisory board structure in Germany, its obligations and duties 
will be presented in the following parts. 
This study focuses on DAX companies that are required to follow the German law, saying that 
in a stock company of above 2000 employees the shareholders and the employees are 
appointing half of the supervisory board each. Not only the election process is determined by 
the number of employees, but also the size of the board, where up to 10.000 employees 12 
members are appointed, up till 20.000 employees 16 and above that 20 representatives are 
appointed. (Bundesministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 1976). In a European Large 
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cap index comparison the average number of board members in Germany is considerably higher 
(Heindrick & Struggles , 2009). The employee representatives are employees of the company 
and members of the trade union, whereas the shareholder can be researchers, freelancers, 
international managers but most often former managers or managers of other large cap 
corporations. In general the board is representing the shareholders and especially the high 
number of employee representatives is putting an emphasis on the importance of this 
stakeholder group in the German system (Stiles & Taylor 2001). The degree of 
internationalization on German boards was in the European comparison distinctly lower 
(Heindrick & Struggles , 2009), which could be explained by the findings of Oxelheim et al. 
(2013) due to language barriers of the employee representatives.  
Because of the common tradition to appoint former managers on boards, the average age of 
German board members is one of the highest in a European comparison (Heindrick & Struggles, 
2009). About 50% of the chairmen of DAX Corporations were former CEOs of the company 
before (Heindrick & Struggles , 2009). Since 2009 financial representatives are often on the 
boards, which are managers or former managers of banks and insurance companies (Koch & 
Stadtmann, 2013). Special about the German board is furthermore that the board is regularly 
elected for five years and then kind of staggered, so relationships between the board members 
within one board but also to the management board exists over a few years. Less than 15% of 
all European countries actually have such long tenures, the average is about 3.1 years. The 
average time on a board of a German board member is about 5.7 years (Heindrick & Struggles, 
2009). Furthermore it is possible for the members to serve on various boards and interlock 
structures exist. Commercial banks have in contrast to the US a certain influencing power on 
the German Insider Systems. Banks are in contrast even allowed to hold equity in corporations 
(Elston & Goldberg, 2003). Elston & Goldberg (2003:1397) furthermore state that there is a 
certain control degree of the banks on the corporate governance systems in Germany, which 
can be described as “(…) beyond the traditional boundaries of the creditor-lender relationship 
(…)”. In accordance with agency theory a higher degree of monitoring by the creditors is 
implied in the German system.  
The laws and the GCGC furthermore determine that there are three bodies determining 
decisions: The executive board including CEO, the board of directors and the annual general 
meeting. A hierarchy of decision power is also set in this chronological order with letting the 
annual general meeting having the highest power, which can be described as sovereign or 
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constitutional power and implies certain veto rights. The supervisory board is responsible for 
the direction of business and the management board for the daily decisions. Furthermore, 
besides internal monitoring by the revision department and the body of the supervisory board a 
statutory auditor is appointed, who audits the corporate governance and its bodies 
(Regierungskommission, 2014).  
2.4.3 Supervisory Board 
The three roles of the supervisory board as determined previously are also represented in the 
German Corporate Governance Code and will be discussed in the following: First the 
supervisory board has the competence to choose the executive board, assess and evaluate the 
work and set the remuneration. Second the review of the annual report and control of reporting 
standards such as the appropriation of earnings use belong to the tasks of the supervisory board 
according to §171 AktG (Andreas, 2011; Bundesministerium der Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 
1965). This part of the tasks incorporates to control that laws and regulations are abided. Thirdly 
one main obligation of the supervisory board is to supervise the management. This implicates 
observing that the overall goals are achieved and the intended strategy gets pursued. The board 
has a veto right for substantial decisions to pursue the before mentioned tasks it the best manner 
(Andreas, 2011).  
2.4.4 Compensation of the Supervisory Board 
The pay setting process is typical for a two-tier board structure (OECD, 2011). The supervisory 
board compensation is set by the shareholders through the annual general meeting, either 
through a change of constitution or a separate resolution. According to this mechanism, neither 
the executive board nor the supervisory board ‘shall’ determine the remuneration to prevent 
self-serving intentions (Deloitte, 2012). This procedure and the double stage principal agent 
model shall prevent the mutual influence of the supervisory board on executive board 
remuneration and the other way around (Andreas, 2011). An involvement of the supervisory 
board on its own remuneration can be seen through proposing a suggesting in the annual general 
meeting, but this is just of formal nature. (Andreas, 2011). The executive management and 
supervisory board submit a proposal for the remuneration of the supervisory board. According 
to Andreas et al. (2010) the supervisory board is just involved due to formal issues. The annual 
general meeting can vote against the proposal. Often protocols of the shareholder meeting are 
published and rejected proposals couldn’t be found through thorough Internet research. To 
summarize, from the policy and constitutional perspective, the transparent two-tier system and 
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the pay setting process is preventing cronyism actions. Regarding the transparency and decision 
power of the shareholders on the annual general meeting one can introduce the study of 
Kronlund & Sandy (2014) here. The ‘Say on Pay’ principle gives the shareholders of a firm the 
possibility to vote for on the remuneration of executives and transparency is increased by this 
(CFA Institute, 2013). A recent study in on US firms showed though that although the aim of 
‘Say on Pay’ was increased transparency and alignment of interests as agency theory predicts‚ 
‚(...) the net effect of these changes is higher total pay’ (Kronlund & Sandy, 2014:38). This 
recognition of not making CEO compensation more efficient shows the scrutiny given to the 
shareholder committee does not eventually contribute. Adopting this to the German annual 
general meeting and shareholder decision power, which actually adopted a non-binding say on 
pay (CFA Institute, 2013) and the supervisory board, one could possibly explain why the 
shareholders do not make use of their veto rights and vote against lower supervisory board 
compensation or prevent cronyism measures. 
The amount and type of payment to the supervisory board (§113 AktG) (Bundesministerium 
der Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 1965) is not determined by law. The GCGC is providing 
some guidelines, which are as found by Lazar et al. (2013:4) just followed in parts. Furthermore 
they state that the coherent compensation system and structure is offering only “(…) limited 
incentives for “professional” non-executive directors.” Between 2002 and 2012 the 
compensation recommendation of the GCGC contained a fixed and a variable part. Since then 
this variable part was removed and the performance – risk relation is therefore broken up. As a 
PwC Study finds the trend is going in the direction of reducing variable compensation parts 
(Hösch, 2010). Nowadays the GCGC explicitly states that if variable compensation is a optional 
component and if included, it should be a long-term-performance incentive 
(Regierungskommission, 2014). Furthermore no advice is given how the performance related 
part should be determined and which key indicators should be used for firm performance. 
According to the German Corporate Governance Code and Lazar et al. (2013) the compensation 
of the German supervisory board can be divided into the following elements and characteristics. 
Fixed remuneration is paid for being appointed, holding positions and fulfilling the duties 
(non-performance based). One can state furthermore that the basic remuneration for employees 
and shareholder representatives is equal. The employee representatives who belong to a trade 
union are obligated to donate their salaries to Hans-Böckler Stiftung, a foundation of the 
Confederation of German Trade Unions (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, , 2010). In regard to this the 
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incentive element of the remuneration in accordance with the agency theory can be considered 
as limited (Andreas, 2011).  
Function-related remuneration is paid for being chairman or deputy chairman and effort-
related compensation for being involved in committee work and also in the sense of meeting-
attendance fees. In all DAX30 companies, the chairman receives a higher compensation; the 
ratio lies between 1.5 and 2 of ordinary members (Lazar, Metzner, Rapp, & Wolff, 2013). The 
use of attendance fees as part of the function related compensation increased over the past years 
and as Lazar et al. (2013) found out in their research on listed German Corporations they ranged 
from EUR 200 till EUR 5.000. In general they make up a relatively small part of the 
remuneration. 
Variable remuneration is paid in relation to firm-performance, either within the fiscal year 
(short-term) or long-time elements accounting for a longer period than the fiscal year are used. 
Previous research shows that in 2012 although recommended, just a small percentage of the 
firms used the elements of long-term performance compensation (Metzner, Rapp, & Wolff, 
2012). In general one can furthermore state that supervisory board compensation is, other than 
in the US (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014), cash based and not linked to options or other stock 
compensation (Lazar, Metzner, Rapp, & Wolff, 2013). In Germany it is furthermore possible, 
even though done rarely, to negotiate a consultancy contract between a supervisory board 
member and the company with additional compensation for complementary advisory services. 
The validity of the contract needs to be approved by the whole supervisory board (Hutzenreuter, 
Metten, & Weigland, 2012) and the remuneration has to be disclosed.  
Regarding the compensation it has to be added that the supervisory board compensation should 
underlie a non-discrimination percept, which means that members should be remunerated 
according to their tasks and functions but not due to individualities (Koch & Stadtmann, 2013; 
Andreas, 2011) 
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2.4.5 Recent Developments 
Koch & Stadtmann (2013:56) state: ‘The topic of supervisory board compensation in Germany 
is currently of high interest, and it can be said that the supervisory boards are moving more 
and more into the public eye.’ This is not only due to compensation topic reasons, but also 
issues like composition of the board, tasks of the board and efficiency of work. 
To start with the composition, one can state that the diversity of supervisory boards was 
discussed and political movements in Germany, which demanded 30% women on supervisory 
boards (Tower Watson, 2014) and binding quotas were introduced (Nienaber, 2014). 
Furthermore former CEO members have to make a two years break before they can be 
appointed to the supervisory board (Andreas, 2011). Furthermore the GCGC was changed and 
employing a financial expert on the board with special accounting knowledge is now demanded 
(Regierungskommission, 2014). Furthermore the number of employee representatives is very 
high in the international comparison and this issue is discussed in regards of the efficiency of 
monitoring (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010). This leads us from the topic of composition 
towards the efficiency of the board discussion. Besides the monitoring competencies of the 
employees the working methods and processes of supervisory boards of criticized in general 
(Pacher & von Preen, 2014). 
The GCGC is providing a certain definition of an independent member and a study did show 
that on average the criteria of independence was not fulfilled adequately (Hutzenreuter, Metten, 
& Weigland, 2012). But it was detected that the frequency of having multiple seats decreased 
and therefore the busyness of individuals and the dependence relations (Andreas, 2011). 
Departing from interdependences one can also observe changes in the responsibilities of the 
supervisory board members. The members can be made individually liable for decisions, i.e. 
the decision on adequate CEO compensation (Koch & Stadtmann, 2013). Also because of this 
a trend of Directors & Officers Liability Insurance to prevent being sued individually can be 
detected (Andreas, 2011). This demands that the responsibilities and tasks are fulfilled in the 
right manner. Nowadays a higher degree of advisory activities is demanded (Andreas, 2011:17) 
and therefore the demanded monitoring skills and abilities also increased. 
One example for the changed role and task is that the control function has developed in the past 
years. Previously annual reports were checked backward looking. Nowadays the possibilities 
of active involvement and contribution increased. As example Andreas et al. (2010:26) names 
a ‘Follow-up’ reporting obligation of the executive board towards the supervisory board to 
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present revised results. Furthermore the strategic advisory component requires a permanent 
consulting (Andreas, 2011). Additionally the advisory function of the supervisory board and 
conflict of interests are a topic of recent discussions. Supervisors want to work as advisors of 
the management on the one hand and on the other hand have the obligation being an 
independent control body (Andreas, 2011). In the 2006th Annual Meeting on the GCGC 
Clemens Börsig, a former executive board member and later chairman of the board of Deutsche 
Bank, also presented his position papers on the changing role of the chairman. He states that 
responsibilities and tasks became more intensive over the years. The original task as a 
“honorable task” changed to a more demanding task and the tasks of the executive board and 
supervisory board converged (Börsig, 2006). Lazar et al. (2013) describe this change as “(…) 
these regulatory changes turned the formerly “honorary post” of a supervisory board member 
(non-executive director) into a time consuming position with substantial responsibilities (and 
also liabilities)”. Due to this a higher compensation is demanded in general. Furthermore 
changes in variable compensation can be observed. In Germany, equally like in Sweden, it is 
not possible (since 2005), other than in the US, to compensate with options or warrants as 
performance related elements (Andreas, 2011). Most research showed that in accordance with 
the agency theory, directors are compensated for their monitoring function and control role 
(Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). Especially since the financial crisis, the variable remuneration, 
which was relatively high in the past, is decreasing and fixed elements occur more frequent 
again (Pacher & von Preen, 2014). Also since the crisis the interest in corporate governance 
and the interest in the relationship between pay and performance increased tremendously as 
detected by Clement (2009). These observations were confirmed by the recent Tower Watson 
Study (2014) on DAX30 companies. With the 2012 changes of the GCGC the trend back 
towards a fixed remuneration and less variable compensation was furthermore found (Tower 
Watson, 2014; Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz, 2014). It was also observed 
that the remuneration of the non-executive directors is relatively low in the international 
comparison (Tower Watson, 2014). It was also found that diversity increased in two ways, 
internationality on boards increased up to 29% and women made up 24% of supervisory board 
members in 2014 (Tower Watson, 2014). 
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2.5 Empirical Determinants of Supervisory Board 
Remuneration 
2.5.1 Previous Findings  
More often than supervisory board compensation, executive compensation was object to 
previous empirical studies. As a point of departure, besides the above stated scientifically 
accepted theories (2.2 ROLE OF SUPERVISORY BOARD) we used studies on the determinants of 
board of directors and executives compensation. According to Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014:6) 
research on chairman compensation and ‘(…) determinants of board compensation is heavily 
influenced by research on executive compensation.’ In the past the three categories of CEO and 
chairman compensation determinants ‘criteria’, ‘governance’ and ‘contingenices’ (Barkema & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998: 136) were identified and followed up in further research. Not only the 
same categories bring the two research topics close but also the as previously researched 
singular relationship between the two, which makes it an interesting topic for further 
investigations (Roberts & Stiles, 1999). Furthermore there are ‚ ‘(...) firm specific and economic 
factors that have an effect on both positions (...)’ (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014: 6) and the 
hereafter named criteria will be incorporated in the study. The previous section will be 
structured into Chairman Characteristics, Corporate Governance Characteristics including CEO 
specifics and Firm Characteristics containing economic determinants. These criteria 
classification will guide the reader trough the conducted thesis (3.3 VARIABLES). 
In the historical context one can state that most of the studies conducted were based on US and 
UK data and therefore also Anglo-American structured one-tier boards and outsider system 
shaped environments had priority. More recently research has also extended to non-executive 
directors, compensation elements in regards to the increasing complexity of the tasks and 
women on boards. Research on CEO compensation builds a basis for derivations and 
interferences of chairmen payment determinants. In this study CEO compensation is also an 
element of interest and used as explanatory variable. 
Researchers determined firm size and complexity as compensation determinants, among other 
Firm Characteristics and economic determinants. Both can be used to proxy the complexity of 
the monitoring task of the board. As approximation one can name sales (Chen, 2014) and total 
assets (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2005). Furthermore the complexity dimension was further 
researched and identified as significant with the following approximations: company growth 
(Yermack , 2005) price to book ratio (Linn & Park, 2005) and stock price volatility (Brick, 
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Palmon, & Wald, 2005). Regarding the Firm Characteristics, previous findings indicate mixed 
findings about the influence of firm performance on board compensation. One the one hand 
studies argue that a positive relation is indicated (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2005) and on the 
other hand findings provide information about a lower compensation with increasing 
performance (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). This topic will also be observed in the conducted study, 
especially because the DAX30 companies were influenced by the financial crisis and its 
aftermath. Furthermore ownership and block holders, in regards to the agency theory (2.1 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & SUPERVISORY BOARD STRUCTURES and 2.2 ROLE OF SUPERVISORY 
BOARD) have been identified as crucial and determining in previous research.  
The intensity and power of corporate governance mechanisms, categorized into Corporate 
Governance characteristics, make up another field of determinants of compensation. Previous 
researchers i.e. found that the size of the board could possibly effect the performance of the 
board negatively and therefore the compensation (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). Furthermore it was 
indicated that the board’s effort and attempt, which can be measured with a proxy of meetings 
attended (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2005) has an increasing influence on chairman 
compensation. This study also investigates upon if this measure influences chairman 
compensation. 
When ownership is dispersed, boards can obtain greater monetary compensation, because the 
lack of ownership control is allowing for bigger rewards for the agents (Elston & Goldberg, 
2003). Elston & Goldberg (2003) find furthermore that the influence of German banks as block 
holders reduce compensation like the ownership dispersion argument. Andreas et al. (2010) can 
confirm that ownership concentration, management ownership and external block holders have 
a negative correlation with supervisory board compensation. Sticking to the CEO specifics and 
its compensation in a one-tier framework, divided evidence on the influence of CEO payments 
on non-executive director pay levels is coherent. Boyd (1994) conducted research on the reverse 
relation and could find a positive relation of non-director compensation on CEO compensation, 
whereas the American compensation expert Graef S. Crystal states (1991) that the increased 
pay to non-executive board members is a payback for increased CEO compensation. Results of 
Clarkson & Olsson (2010:40) show that the Mixed Swedish system, which is a stakeholder 
oriented system and shaped by civil law, is in line with agency theory, which states that directors 
are compensated in line with interests of the shareholders. Furthermore they can find, as 
Oxelheim & Randøy (2003) already proposed, the salary increased with Anglo-American 
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directors on board and that ‘performance pay’ is more common in Anglo-Saxon boards. They 
furthermore found that the busyness of directors is positively correlated with compensation. 
This is not in line with previous studies were researches determine that ‘(…) busy boards can 
suffer from coordination problems.’ (Clarkson & Olsson, 2010:41).  
Koch & Stadtmann (2013) found that the compensation of the supervisory board individuals is 
mainly driven by the roles and functions (Chairman Compensation characteristics) of the board 
members, as the GCGC recommends. They furthermore found that as recommended with the 
non-discrimination precept gender, PHD title, the member’s background and being employee 
and non-employee have no statistically significant influence on compensation. Furthe they 
detected that average individual board compensation was lower the more females were 
appointed to the boards.  
Besides the three main categories of determinants and going into German research, one can 
identify the hereafter-named proxies as determining chairman compensation. Andreas et al. 
(2010) analyzed the link between firm success and compensation levels in Germany and used 
shareholder return, divided yield and return on assets and return on capital and did find a 
statistically positive relation. Furthermore it can be expected that stewardship theory, in the 
Anglo-American of Swedish comparison is building an anchor. This leads over to the reference 
point, where the aimed new contribution of our research is stated.  
2.5.2 Reference Point 
Departing from the Insider- and Outsider Corporate Governance Systems and the traditional 
underlying theories one can argue like Hahn & Lasfer (2010:10) that the lack of research in 
non-executive director remuneration exists due to a ‘(…) lack of consensus on the non-executive 
director role.’ This argument leads us into specialty of the country chosen. As stated above 
(2.5.1 PREVIOUS FINDINGS) in the past primarily CEO compensation in the common law shaped 
one-tier US system built the basis for empirical studies in corporate governance research. In the 
Anglo-American research framework one-tier boards and the Outsider Corporate Governance 
Systems are empirically analyzed and data were gathered. As already defined by Elston & 
Goldberg (2003:1392) ‘Germany is a country of particular interest not only because it has 
considerably lower levels of compensation than the US, but also because it has a very different 
corporate governance structure, (…)’. This is commonly mentioned, when defining research 
gaps in corporate governance in Europe. Only a few empirical analyses on Mixed systems and 
two-tier systems have been conducted. The country specifics was detected by Oxelheim & 
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Clarkson (2014) before and, when dipping into the current German research on supervisory 
board compensation, verified. Koch & Stadtmann (2013:57) recognize, that ‘(…) most previous 
research is concerned with analyzing executive directors’ compensation rather than with that 
of supervisory board member’s compensation. It is furthermore interesting to focus on the 
German two-tier board system because it is a prototype model and other countries’ systems like 
Austria and Poland (Heindrick & Struggles , 2009) can also derive conclusions. So we will add 
to the previously conducted research by conducting a detailed analysis on the level of chairman 
compensation of German DAX30 companies. Furthermore the relation between the CEOs and 
Chairmen is of special interest and will be examined. Generally in past research, CEO 
compensation and the dependency of this on director compensation was focused, as the study 
of Brick et al. (2005) shows. In the same approach as Oxelheim and Clarkson (2014) we analyze 
the reverse relation between the two and research on cronyism. They analyzed the reverse 
relation (choice of dependent variable and explanatory variable) for the first time and this will 
also be the point of departure for this study. Equally like Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014) only the 
chairman is the central element of interest in this study. One can take upon their argumentation, 
because a chairman and his compensation is incorporating all the characteristics of the 
remuneration system (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). Also as a former CEO, has the greatest 
power in the board and a high probability of having strong social contacts to the management. 
Analyzing the same relation makes a comparison between the Swedish Mixed System and the 
German two-tier board system possible. Starting off with their cronyism definition and findings 
on mutual back scratching, the specialties of the German board and the increased focus on 
supervisory board compensation in the public media make this field an attractive research topic. 
The starting point was set here and the decision made to also edit the time horizon and include 
turbulent times of the crisis. The changes in disclosure obligation make it possible to analyze 
the scope or remuneration of nearly 10 years. According to Lazar et al. (2013) “The demand 
for effective supervision is also reflected in the latest regulatory initiatives throughout the world 
in the aftermath of the recent financial crises.” Their research is also building a very good 
status quo presentation of the situation of supervisory board compensation in Germany. What 
the most recent studies in Germany miss is the cronyism discussion and the CEO compensation 
as the main explanatory variable. 
So the conducted study can go further in the time dimension and contribute also from the point 
of recent discussion topics in the public media on performance based compensation of 
chairmen. It is very interesting to see if differences exist between compensation systems, since 
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German companies have the possibility to proactively decide if fixed or variable compensation 
is used (Block, von Preen, & Bursee, 2012; Bartz & von Werder, 2014). Especially connecting 
to the findings of Hölz (2013), who argues that variable compensation is sending misleading 
incentives in the two-tier board setting, an investigation on the CEO-chairman relation seems 
appealing. It is argued that if both boards are compensated this way the motivations diverge and 
can influence arising conflicts, especially for the supervisory board, which should concentrate 
on monitoring. The fixed and variable compensation argument also fits to the new contribution 
of this study, because not only the total outcome of the compensation system in form of a total 
chairman salary is used but also both elements of compensation are analyzed. Latest research 
and determinants of supervisory board compensation on two-tier boards by Andreas et al. 
(2010) and Koch & Stadtmann (2013) build the point of departure for research in the German 
settings. Based on these theoretical backgrounds we identified three hypotheses that we test in 
this study. They will be introduced in the next section, followed by a description of our data 
collection and an explanation of each variable used. In the last step we explain the methodology 
of our econometric model.  
  24 
 
 
   
3 Methodology 
3.1 Hypotheses 
To start of our research we formulate research questions in constructing three different 
hypotheses. Our hypotheses are set according to the governance environment of German listed 
firms and in light with previous research introduced before (2.5 EMPIRICAL DETERMINANTS OF 
SUPERVISORY BOARD REMUNERATION). The supervisory board’s task is to monitor the 
management board but not to interfere in daily decisions of the management board. A chairman, 
who is not an employee representative rules the supervisory board. While the management 
board’s remuneration consists to a large part of a variable portion, as our research shows, the 
chairman’s compensation is not depending on the firm’s performance to the same extent. This 
is due to the fact that the chairman’s main task is to monitor the management mainly, no matter 
how the firm is performing. There is also a large difference in remuneration levels. The CEO 
usually earns a multiple of the chairman’s compensation. The supervisory board has the 
decision-making authority on CEO compensation while the management board together with 
the supervisory board, proposes the chairman and supervisory board compensation to the annual 
general meeting. Departing from these points, our variables of interest representing the possible 
cronyism relation are CEO and chairmen compensation. Since our sample also covers the time 
frame of the financial crisis (3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH & DATA COLLECTION), we need to test 
if that has an impact on CEO compensation.  
Regarding these given facts we formulate hypotheses to test the influences on chairman 
remuneration in light of suspected cronyism by controlling for Chairman Characteristics, 
Corporate Governance Characteristics, Firm Characteristics and Remuneration in Crisis. The 
first hypothesis covers the relationship between total CEO compensation and chairman 
compensation. It is build based on the theories mentioned above, mainly the principal agent and 
in light of theories regarding dependence relations. The hypothesis is also tested as it was 
included in the previous research of Oxelheim. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and chairman 
compensation4 
                                                 
4 Following a stricter statistical formulation, we are testing the null hypothesis of no relationship. 
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The second hypothesis controls for the fixed and variable parts of CEO and chairman 
compensation. A separate regression test for the fixed part and also the variable part is done. 
The rationales behind this hypothesis are theories presented in section 2.3 SUPERVISORY BOARD 
REMUNUERATION. We want to test if a positive relationship between the fixed CEO and the 
fixed chairman compensation exists. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between fixed CEO compensation and 
fixed chairman compensation 
The global economic and financial crises starting in 2007 hit western economies hard. Germany 
was also affected, although not to the same extent as other countries. We still want to control 
for this and investigate if the crisis did affect chairman compensation. The third hypothesis 
incorporates this. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant impact of the financial crisis on chairman 
compensation 
To test our hypotheses we identified various variables to use in an ordinary least-square (OLS) 
regression. In the next section it is explained how the data was retrieved, followed by a detailed 
description of the variables used. 
3.2 Research Approach & Data collection 
According to Gary Henry’s (1990) argument ‘when dealing with small populations (less than 
50 members), collecting data on the entire population often improves the reliability and 
credibility of the data.’ the performed study on the DAX30 companies (Table A 8: DAX30 
Companies) was conducted on the whole population. Thornhill et al. (2009) recommends 
collecting data from a total population if the data collection is feasible. According to Oxelheim 
& Wihlborg (2008:217) the research method of conducting a study on a whole population can 
also be described as analyzing a ‘super population’. The study does not have to cope with 
problems according to sampling techniques and the reliability of sampling. It has the benefit of 
an easy and true hypothesis testing (Henry, 1990). Since there are plenty more stock 
corporations listed in Germany, the analyzed companies are only a part of a larger pool of listed 
companies. The research was conducted with secondary data retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, Thomson Reuters Eikon and manually collected data of annual reports of the 
population. The benefit is that a 100% response rate is obtained (Thornhill, Saunders, & Adrian, 
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2009) The quality is high in comparison to manual data collection (Steward & Kamins, 1993). 
Furthermore the secondary sources, especially Datastream but also the annual reports are 
assembled by the same originators and therefore stable and repeated over long periods 
(Thornhill, Saunders, & Adrian, 2009). One pitfall can be a certain aggregation of data 
(Thornhill, Saunders, & Adrian, 2009), which is detected in annual reports to some extend and 
can be described as biasing and unsuitable to detect true values. For example pensions paid to 
CEOs are often not included in the annual remuneration of CEOs and disclosed in different 
formats. Sometimes pensions are not disclosed at all. Wherever they are disclosed we add them 
to fixed compensation. This argument represents the contra argument of having restricted 
control on the data (Thornhill, Saunders, & Adrian, 2009). Nevertheless collecting secondary 
data was more applicable in a cost-benefit-relation for this study and the authors are convinced 
that a critical evaluation is sufficient to draw conclusions on the research question. A 
quantitative analysis with the help of EViews is conducted with these secondary data. The 
retrieved dataset consists mainly of two forms of data: numerical continuous data and 
categorical data. Compensation in EUR values or chairman age are data which can take on any 
value within a certain interval. Categorical data and especially dichotomous data take on a 
number but just between two categories (Thornhill, Saunders, & Adrian, 2009). In the 
conducted study various dummy variables are used, where a categorization between two groups 
i.e. “former CEO or non-former CEO” is made. Since a time dimension and a CSU dimension 
is analyzed, the data set is a panel data set. The data consists of chairman compensation of 
German DAX30 companies over the time period from 2006-2014. We are investigating on the 
30 companies that are listed in the DAX at the publication date of this research, no matter if 
they were not in the index for the complete observation period to stay consistent. We use 2006 
as the starting point as in most cases before 2006 no data on the independent variable CEO 
Compensation was disclosed. Since our sample stretches through the periods of the financial 
crisis we have to incorporate possible implications into our analysis.  
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
In the following, an explanation on the variables used in the study is given. Table 1: Variable 
Definition and Description, presents a condensed overview and description of each variable. 
Furthermore our hypothesized effect on the dependent variable and the supporting theory 
behind this hypothesis data source of the variable is shown. To start with the dependent variable 
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in our study is Chairman Compensation. It was chosen in accordance with previous research 
by Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014). The variable is calculated as the total sum of all payments to 
the chairman, including fixed and variable components and payments for additional committee 
roles. The proportion of variable to total compensation varies a lot in our sample. To account 
for that and investigate on these effects, a second scenario is constructed with the dependent 
variable being fixed compensation (4.2.1. FIXED COMPENSATION). Chairman compensation 
increased on average by 6.5% annually between 2006 and 2014. On average a chairman of a 
DAX30 company earned EUR 228,127 in 2006 to EUR 364,373 in 2014. Compensation 
increased the most from 2009 to 2010 by 26%, just to go through the highest drop by 9% till 
2011. In total, compensation rose by 60% from 2006 levels to 2014. 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variable 
We include one explanatory variable into our original regression to test if our cronyism 
suspicion is supported. CEO compensation includes the fixed and the variable part of the CEO 
remuneration. We also include pensions as far as they are declared in the companies’ annual 
reports. Also stock options are included as declared in the annual reports. In observations where 
more than one CEO is compensated over the year, the sum is calculated. Since CEO wages are 
set by a supervisory board committee before the annual general meeting 
(Regierungskommission, 2014) we lag CEO compensation by one year. This is in line with the 
approach by Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014).  
For our second scenario the explanatory variable that is used is Fixed chairman compensation. 
It concludes just the fixed part of the CEOs compensation and is retrieved as explained above. 
In the third scenario the explanatory variable is variable chairman compensation. It consists out 
of the variable part of the compensation and is retrieved like the other variables. In order to test 
if a link exists between chairman and CEO remuneration we include three types of control 
variables: Chairman Characteristics, Corporate Governance and Firm Characteristics. 
3.3.3 Control Variables 
Chairman Characteristics  
Our approach regarding control variables is in line with previous studies, to name the ones by 
Andreas et al. al (2010), Andreas (2011), Brick et al. (2002, 2005), Bremert & Schulten (2009), 
Chen (2014), Clarkson & Olsson (2010), Koch & Stadtmann (2013) and finally and most 
inspiring Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014). Based on these previous studies we identified variables 
that are applicable to our research and also introduced variables that are especially important 
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for the German case. The first cluster of controls regards the personality of the chairman. The 
rationale behind this is to test if the distinct characteristics of a chairman have an influence on 
its compensation. For a better understanding this cluster is divided into four subgroups.  
The first one covers the basic characteristics of the chairman. We include three dummies, 
regarding the chairman age, its academic background and its gender. The Age dummy equals 
one if the chairman is over 65 years old. It is calculated as the firm sample year less the 
chairman’s birth year. The variable is included to account for the labor economics theory (Brick, 
Palmon, & Wald, 2002) saying that knowledge and experience increases with age and 
education. Compensation should account for that, therefore and we expect a positive influence 
on compensation (Lazear, 1981; McKnight et al. 2000; Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). The 
Academic dummy equals one if the chairman holds a PhD or a higher academic title and is used 
as a proxy for a higher education level. Due to the higher education, a positive relationship 
towards the independent variable is expected (Koch & Stadtmann, 2013). The third 
characteristics dummy is Gender, which is equal one if the chairman is female. According to 
recent research there is still a remuneration gap between men and women (Koch & Stadtmann, 
2013) and females are underrepresented on boards. This is evident in our sample. Out of the 
270 observations in only six cases the chairman is female. German policymakers reacted on 
that and introduced a quota demanding at least 30% of board members of listed companies to 
be female from 2016 onward (Nienaber, 2014). The expected effect on compensation is 
twofold, as indicated above females earn less on average than their male colleagues. Still it 
could also be argued that due to the distinct position of a chairman the remuneration is fixed no 
matter what the gender is. As our sample shows, regular female supervisory board members 
receive the same remuneration as their male colleagues. Remuneration is usually set equally for 
every board member. We still expect the effect to be negative though; since the dummy is one 
in only six cases we doubt the significance of the variable.  
The second subgroup covers the chairman’s background with its employer. The first variable 
to control for is Tenure, which we include in line with Oxelheim’s approach. It is measured as 
the number of years that the chairman has held the position. We expect a positive influence on 
the dependent variable based on the experience argument stated above. Three other dummy 
variables account for the past positions that the chairman did hold. They are used as proxies to 
indicate the commitment to the firm. The dummies are Founder, Previous executive and 
External director with industry experience. A fourth dummy stating that the chairman is without 
industry experience was dropped to avoid multicollinearity issues. Founder takes on the value 
of one if the chairman or his ancestors founded the firm. Previous executive equals one if the 
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chairman used to hold an executive position in the company previously. External director with 
industry experience equals one if the chairman was not working for the company previously 
but used to work in the industry. The theoretical rationale to include these variables grounds on 
the idea, that the deeper the relationship and entrenchment between the chairman and the firm 
is, the higher the remuneration. It is expected that due to rising experience, commitment and 
therefore stronger ties to the management board (possible cronyism), a higher remuneration is 
paid (2.1.5 CRONYISM).  
The third subgroup covers the chairman’s internationality. According to Greve & Ruigrok 
(2008) a growing number of foreigners on the top executive management can be observed 
lately. The variables International experience and International education are used as proxies 
to show if an international background has a significant influence on chairman remuneration. 
They take on the value of one if the chairman has been studying at a university outside of 
Germany and of one if he has been working in a company domiciled outside of Germany 
respectively. We expect a positive influence on compensation, as the firm will benefit from the 
internationality. The fourth subgroup of Chairman Characteristics accounts for the involvement 
of the chairman.  
The dummy Additional directorship is equal one if the chairman is on the supervisory board of 
at least one other firm. It is used as a proxy to measure the busyness of the chairman. A busy 
chairman is supposedly not able to effectively monitor a firm’s management (Oxelheim & 
Clarkson, 2014). Therefore a lower remuneration is expected. To proxy the chairman’s personal 
commitment to the firm the dummy Substantial equity ownership is constructed. It takes on a 
value of one if the chairman possesses one per cent or more of outstanding shares. We expect 
a positive influence on remuneration as the chairman has more influence on firm’s decisions.  
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
The second cluster of control variables consists of variables concerning corporate governance 
features. As mentioned above, our sample of variables used is in line with previous research. 
While in other studies an emphasis was put on employee representation on the board, we 
decided to disregard that issue as the German Corporate Governance Codex states that 50% of 
board members have to be employee representatives (Regierungskommission, 2014). The 
governance cluster is also divided into four subgroups.  
The first one summarizes variables regarding board characteristics. The Anglo American 
dummy equals one if at least one board member has an US-American, British or Canadian 
citizenship. In line with Oxelheim and Randøy’s findings (2003) we expect a higher 
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remuneration in cases with Anglo-American board members due to the fact that this will lead 
to a tolerance for higher compensation such as in American markets. Internationals controls for 
the percentage of non-Germans on the board and is calculated by dividing the number of non-
German board members by total board members. Including this variable we control for the 
signaling effect that a board with international experience has on investors. The third variable 
controls for the Board size, which is measured as the number of board members. We include 
this variable to account for Fama and Jensen’s (1983) findings that the coordination effort 
increases and effectiveness of the board decreases with rising board sizes. Therefore one can 
assume that the chairman should earn more because of higher demands regarding board 
coordination. Coordination efforts of the chairman will also increase with a busy board as board 
members have other responsibilities outside of the firm (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). To 
control for this, the dummy Busy is used. It takes on the value of one if 50% or more of the 
shareholder representatives hold at least three other directorships at the same time. The dummy 
Financial industry knowledge equals one if at least one board member is working for a company 
in the financial industry like a bank or an insurance firm. These board members are expected to 
possess financial expertise and contribute to the success of the firm (Bremert & Schulten, 2009). 
The second subgroup controls for the ownership structure of the company. The approach is in 
line with Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014) and adapted for the German case. Three dummies are 
used. No major shareholder equals one if the company has no single shareholder owning at 
least 5% of the stocks outstanding. Major shareholder 5-25% equals one if one shareholder 
owns between 5-25% and Major shareholder 25-50% equals one if one shareholder owns 
between 25-50% of stocks outstanding. The case of all dummies turning zero displays a single 
shareholder owning more than 50%. The boundary of 25% was chosen to account for the 
German Stock Corporation Act (Bundesministerium der Justiz und Verbraucherschutz, 1965) 
which enables a block holder of more than 25% to use its blocking minority to block 
fundamental decisions like changes in the company’s constitution for example. The boundary 
of 50% was chosen as this indicates the threshold to complete decisive power. We expect 
declining chairman compensation in a growing block holder stock ownership as monitoring 
will be done to a greater extend by the major block holder (Elston & Goldberg, 2003). With 
this approach the need for high chairman remuneration is not given therefore.  
The third subgroup covers the supervisory board compensation. Variable compensation ratio 
shows the proportion of variable to total board compensation (Bremert & Schulten, 2009). Since 
the variable part will rise in times of good performance, a positive relationship between the 
compensation ratio and chairman remuneration is anticipated. The variable Board 
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compensation is measured as the total board remuneration divided by the total amount of board 
members multiplied by the natural logarithm. We expect a strong positive correlation between 
the single director compensation and the chairman compensation; a high multicollinearity could 
be an issue since the chairman remuneration is a part of the total board compensation.  
The fourth subgroup covers CEO specification and incorporates CEO tenure into the regression 
(Bremert & Schulten, 2009). It is measured as the number of years that the CEO has been in his 
position. We expect a positive relationship towards the independent variable. In 4.4. 
ROBUSTNESS, VALIDITY & RELIABILITY we account for possible cronyism resulting from the 
CEO and the chairman working together since a longer time.  
Firm Characteristics 
The third cluster of control variables consists of variables concerning firm individualities. By 
controlling for Firm Characteristics we are in line with previous research that states an effect 
on executive and non-executive compensation levels (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). The 
variables are put into the two subgroups Firm Size and Asset Ratios. We incorporate variables 
concerning firm size to test if the size of the firm has an influence on the chairman remuneration. 
All data concerning firm characteristics was retrieved via Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
The first variable Size is the logged asset value of the firm (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). We 
anticipate a positive correlation towards the dependent variable as the chairman’s responsibility 
and complexity rises with rising asset value, managers on the board etc. that he has to monitor. 
A higher compensation should account for that. The second variable, Tobin’s q is calculated as 
the sum of the market value of common stock plus the book value of total debt divided by the 
book value of total assets. Tobin’s q is used as a proxy for the firm’s performance and market 
expectations (Oxelheim & Clarkson, 2014). Another proxy for the firm size is the number of 
Employees (Andreas, Rapp, & Wolff, 2010), which is included in the regression by its logged 
value. We anticipate a positive influence on the dependent variable for the same reasons as for 
Size. Another firm size proxy is Sales, which is the logged value of sales of the firm’s business 
year (Chen, 2014). We also expect a positive relation towards compensation as performance is 
often measured in sales figures. The variable part of the chairman compensation should rise 
therefore in growing sales.  
The second subgroup Asset Ratios consists of four variables. Risk is measured as the cash flow 
risk of the firm, which is proxied through the standard deviation of the last five years on the 
firms return on assets (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2005). Since a higher risk indicates a higher 
monitoring effort we expect a positive relationship towards the dependent variable. To proxy 
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for the asset intensity of the firm we use the variable Tangible Assets, which is the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment over the total asset value. Following the research of Brick (2002) 
we anticipate a negative correlation towards the dependent variable. To control for the firm’s 
Leverage we use the ratio of total debt to total assets (Brick 2002). The theoretical implications 
on Chairman Compensation are twofold. On the one hand debt is seen as a monitoring device, 
rising debt levels might therefore offset the chairman’s necessity to monitor, resulting in a lower 
compensation. On the other hand, increased debt might enhance the agency problem between 
stockholders and debtholders and therefore a higher monitoring is needed (Jensen, 1986, 
Williamson, 1988). Following the research by Brick (2002) again, we anticipate declining 
Chairman Compensation as Leverage increases. To proxy for the firm’s Investment activities 
the ratio of capital expenditures over total assets is used (Brick 2002). We expect firms with 
higher investment activities to pay their chairman a higher remuneration, as high investments 
require a higher monitoring effort. Since some of the variables used cover similar aspects, 
mutlicollinearity can be an issue.  
Remuneration in Crisis 
Since our sample includes all years of the financial crisis we included the dummy Crisis to 
control for the effects of the crisis and to research upon the effects of the crisis on chairman 
compensation. The dummy takes on the value of one for the years from 2008-2011. As indicated 
above, many DAX30 companies changed their chairman compensation scheme from one that 
consists of a big flexible portion to one that is mainly fixed in these times. The overall chairman 
compensation did not change tremendously. We expect a negative impact of the crisis on total 
remuneration and also on the success related remuneration 
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Table 1: Variable Definition and Description 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Hypothesized 
Effect 
Supporting 
Theory 
Source 
Dependent Variable 
 
(1) Chairman 
Compensation 
The logged sum of fixed and variable 
salary to the chairman 
  Annual Report 
 
(2) Fixed chairman 
Compensation 
The logged sum of fixed salary to the 
chairman 
  Annual Report 
 
(3) Variable chairman 
Compensation 
The logged sum of variable salary to 
the chairman 
  Annual Report 
Independent Variable 
 
(1) CEO compensation The logged sum of fixed and variable 
salary to the CEO, including the value 
of stock grants, stock options and 
pensions as reported in the firm’s 
annual reports, lagged by one year 
Positive Managerial Power 
 Agency Theory 
Annual Report 
 
(2) Fixed CEO 
compensation 
The logged sum of fixed salary to the 
CEO, including pensions as reported 
in the firm’s annual reports, lagged by 
one year 
Positive Managerial Power 
 Agency Theory 
Annual Report 
  
(3) Variable CEO 
compensation 
The logged sum of variable salary to 
the CEO, including the value of stock 
grants, and stock options as reported 
in the firm’s annual reports, lagged by 
one year 
Positive Managerial Power 
 Agency Theory 
Annual Report 
Chairman Characteristics Control Variables 
  Basic Characteristics 
 
Age (0,1) Dummy equals one if chairman is 
over 65 years old 
Positive Labor Economics 
Theory 
Internet Research 
 
Academic (0,1) Dummy equals one if chairman has a 
PHD or higher academic title 
Positive Labor Economics 
Theory 
Internet Research 
 
Gender (0,1) Dummy equals one if chairman is 
female 
Negative Labor Economics 
Theory 
Internet Research 
  Background with Company 
 
Chairman Tenure The number of years that the 
chairman has held its position, 
including the year of appointment 
Positive Agency Theory Eikon 
Internet Research 
 
Founder (0,1) Dummy equals one if chairman is 
founder of the firm or his ancestors 
were 
Positive Agency Theory Eikon 
Internet Research 
 
Previous executive 
(0,1) 
Dummy equals one if chairman was 
executive manager before becoming 
chairman  
Positive Agency Theory Eikon 
Internet Research 
 
External director with 
industry experience 
(0,1) 
Dummy equals one if chairman was 
director at another firm in the same 
industry before his appointment  
Slightly 
Negative 
Agency Theory Eikon 
Internet Research 
  Internationality 
 
International 
experience (0,1) 
Dummy equals one if chairman has 
worked outside of Germany before 
Positive Labor Economics 
Theory 
Internet Research 
 
International education 
(0,1) 
Dummy equals one if chairman has 
received higher education outside of 
Germany before 
Positive Labor Economics 
Theory 
Internet Research 
  Involvement 
 
Additional 
directorships (0,1) 
Dummy equals one if chairman is on 
the supervisory board of at least 
another firm 
Negative Agency Theory Annual Report 
  
Substantial equity 
ownership (0,1) 
Dummy equals one if chairman owns 
at least 1% of shares 
Positive Agency Theory Annual Report 
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Variable name Variable Description 
Hypothesized 
Effect 
Supporting 
Theory 
Source 
Corporate Governance Characteristics Control Variables 
  Board Characteristics 
 
Anglo American (0,1) Dummy equals one if at least one 
director is Anglo-American  
Positive Signaling Effect 
Internationalization 
Internet Research 
 
Board size  Total number of directors on the 
supervisory board 
Positive Agency Theory Annual Report 
 
Busy (0,1) Dummy equals one if 50% or more of 
non-employee directors hold at least 3 
other directorships  
Negative Agency Theory Annual Report 
 
Internationals Percentage of non-Germans on the 
board 
Positive Signaling Effect 
Internationalization 
Annual Report 
 
Financial industry 
knowledge (0,1) 
Dummy equals one if at least one 
chairman has a financial industry 
background 
Positive Signaling Effect Annual Report 
Internet Research 
  Ownership 
 
No major Shareholder 
(0,1) 
Dummy equals one if no shareholder 
holds 5% or more company shares 
Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
 
Major Shareholder 5-
25% (0,1) 
Dummy equals one if there is a major 
shareholder which holds between 5-
25% of shares 
Negative Agency Theory Datastream 
 
Major Shareholder 25-
50% (0,1) 
Dummy equals one if there is a major 
shareholder which holds between 25-
50% of shares 
Negative Agency Theory Datastream 
Compensation 
 
Variable compensation 
coefficient 
Proportion of variable to total director 
compensation as reported in the 
firm’s annual reports 
Positive Agency Theory Annual Report 
 
Board compensation Logged average per director 
compensation calculated as total 
supervisory board compensation 
divided by board size 
Positive Agency Theory Annual Report 
  CEO specification 
  
CEO tenure Tenure of the CEO Positive Agency Theory Eikon 
Internet Research 
Firm Characteristics Control Variables 
  Firm Size 
 Size Logged asset value Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
 
Tobin's q Market value of common stock plus 
the book value of total debt divided 
by the book value of total assets 
Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
 Employees Logged number of employees Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
 Sales Logged sales value in EUR Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
  Asset Ratios 
 
Risk Cash Flow risk measured as SD of 
last 5 years return on firms assets 
Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
 
Tangible Assets Ratio of property plant and equipment 
over total assets 
Positive Agency Theory Datastream 
 Leverage Ratio of debt over assets  Negative Agency Theory Datastream 
  
Investment activities Ratio of capital expenditures over 
assets 
Negative Agency Theory Datastream 
Remuneration in Crises Control Variable 
  
Crisis (0,1) Dummy equals one if economy is in 
financial and economic crisis 
Negative Agency Theory  OECD 
 
  
  35 
 
 
   
3.3.4 Cronyism Effects 
In Table 1: Variable Definition and Description, hypothesized and expected effects of the above 
mentioned variables are shown. To detect cronyism especially the chairman characteristic of 
Previous executive is important as well as the Chairman tenure and the CEO tenure. We 
perceive these variables to express in the best way how strong the chairman is entrenched in 
the company, how strong the network of the chairmen is and how close the chairman is 
connected to the executive board. We expect cronyism effects to be stronger the longer the CEO 
and chairman work together and the longer the chairman has worked in the company itself. 
Other variables that we identified to be especially significant in indicating cronyism are: Sales, 
Size and Tobin’s q. If a rise in all of them happens at the same time, than the cronyism effects 
cannot be detected, because rising salaries might have been influenced by an increased overall 
performance. One should be more suspicious if these values indicate a downturn in economic 
performance of the company but the salary of the chairman increases. 
3.3.5 Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Matrix 
To test for a possible multicollinearity between our variables in the base case, a correlation 
matrix generated by EViews is used (Table A 9: Pooled OLS Regression: Correlation Matrix). 
As the table shows, there is only correlation above the critical threshold of 0.8 (Brooks, 2014) 
identified in the case of Sales and Employees, therefore Sales gets excluded. To raise the 
validity of our results we lower the threshold to 0.6. This is motivated by a high adjusted R-
squared and high standard errors of the excluded variables. Further variables have to be 
excluded therefore, these are Board compensation, Size and Tangible Assets. Table A 13: Fixed 
Effects OLS Regression: Descriptive Statistics shows the descriptive statistics of all variables 
used. Testing on multicollinearity in the fixed compensation scenario (Hypothesis 2) shows that 
multicollinearity is also present (). We exclude Employees and Tangible assets therefore. In the 
variable compensation scenario we exclude the Variable compensation quotient, Employees 
and Investment activities, the descriptive statistics are presented at the bottom of Table A 13: 
Fixed Effects OLS Regression: Descriptive Statistics.  
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3.4 Econometric Approach 
Our econometric approach to test upon our hypotheses is in line with previous literature. We 
apply multivariate tests to examine the relationship between our explanatory variable and the 
control variables on chairman compensation. Hypothesis one and three are tested using the 
following OLS regression model which is already accounted for multicollinearity: 
Regression (1) 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2−12𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13−22𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23−27𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽28𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁 stands for each cross-section (firm), 𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇 stands for each period (2006-2014). 
α is the intercept and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽1−28 are the estimated coefficients for the variables 
introduced in chapter 3.3 VARIABLES. As already mentioned we did control for multicollinearity 
and autocorrelation. Heteroscedasticity is controlled for by including heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors via the EViews coefficient covariance method ‘White (diagonal)’. 
Since we are dealing with panel data we need to test if fixed or random effects should be used 
to solve heterogeneity in the time and cross section. As we include the dummy Crisis we are 
not controlling for heterogeneity in the time dimension. Regarding the cross section we apply 
at first a redundant fixed effects test to determine if fixed effects are necessary or not (Brooks, 
2014). The fixed effects specification forced EViews to drop the variables Founder and 
External director with industry experience. The cross section F-Test and 𝜒2 p-values indicate 
that the restrictions are not supported by the data. Therefore we cannot apply a pooled sample 
(Table A 14: Redundant Fixed Effects Test (CSU)). For consistency reasons we present the 
empirical results in section 4.1. EMPIRICAL RESULTS CHAIRMAN COMPENSATION. In line with 
Brooks (2014) we estimate a random effects model to test if random effects are more suitable 
regarding the cross section. A Hausman specification test is made to distinguish if the random 
effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The p-value for the test is less than 1% 
(Table A 15: Hausman Test). This indicates that the random effects model is not applicable. 
The fixed effects specification is preferred therefore. 
To test the relationship between fixed chairman and fixed CEO compensation levels 
(Hypothesis two) an additional OLS regression model is constructed:  
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Regression (2) 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛽2−10𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11−21𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22−27𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽28𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Fixed chairman compensation is the fixed part of the chairman remuneration (3.3.2 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE). Fixed CEO compensation is the fixed part that the CEO earns no 
matter how the company performs it is lagged by one year. We also incorporated pension 
payments into that figure. Just like for total compensation, the data was retrieved from the 
company’s annual reports. The control variables are the same as in our first OLS regression but 
since we used a fixed effects model for this regression as well we are forced to drop the variables 
Founder and External director with industry experience. In a second step we investigate the 
effects of variable compensation in the same manner. It is calculated as:  
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛.  
Regression (3) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝛽2−10𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11−20𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽21−26𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽27𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The results of the performed regressions are presented in the following chapter. 
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4 Regression Analysis & Discussion 
4.1 Empirical Results: Chairman Compensation 
In this section we show at first the empirical results of Regression (1) and distinguish between 
the pooled and the fixed effects outcomes. In the next chapter the results of Regression (2) and 
(3) are shown. In chapter 4.3 DISCUSSION a thorough discussion of our outcomes is given. In 
chapter 4.4 ROBUSTNESS, VALIDITY & RELIABILITY we look critically at our research regarding 
the robustness of our outcomes. 
Our results of the OLS regression of Chairman Compensation are presented in the following. 
Table 2: Pooled Regression shows the results for the pooled regression, Table 3: Fixed Effects 
Regression the results for the fixed effects regression. As indicated in 3.4 ECONOMETRIC 
APPROACH, we use the fixed effects model to draw final conclusions. To compare the German 
outcomes with the Swedish ones we include the pooled outputs as Oxelheim & Clarkson’s  
study (2014) relies on a pooled regression. In each regression analysis we use a forwards 
stepwise approach. 
We always present five models according to the five stages analyzed. In the first setting the 
model consists of just the dependent and the independent variable. In the second one the first 
set of control variables, Chairman Characteristics gets added. In the next steps the control 
groups according to their perceived importance Corporate Governance Characteristics, Firm 
Characteristics and the Crisis dummy get added. This approach is identical for all the following 
regression outputs. When interpreting the results one has to keep in mind that some variables 
are logged while others are not. 
4.1.1 Pooled Regression 
The following table shows the pooled regression outputs. Due to multicollinearity issues the 
variables Board compensation, Sales, Size and Tangible Assets are excluded from the model. 
In the first model we can observe a positive relationship between CEO compensation and 
Chairman compensation (0.47) at the 1% significance level. This result is similar across each 
of the five models. In model five, which includes all sets of control variables, we see a 
significant coefficient at the 1% level of 0.38. This coefficient is slightly lower than in the first 
model. Furthermore we see significantly positive relationships between Additional 
directorships, Chairman tenure, Board size and the Variable compensation coefficient, on 
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Chairman compensation. A higher Risk level has a negative impact on Chairman 
compensation. These results provide evidence for our first hypothesis, stating the existence of 
a positive relationship between chairman and CEO compensation levels. Hypothesis three has 
to be neglected though as the Crisis dummy is not significant in model five.   
  40 
 
 
   
Table 2: Pooled Regression on Chairman compensation 
  
Pooled OLS estimation of Chairman compensation 2006-2014 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Chairman compensation (ln) 
Independent variable      
CEO compensation (ln) 0.466*** 
(6.94) 
0.457*** 
(7.44) 
0.399*** 
(5.71) 
0.380*** 
(5.16) 
0.376** 
(5.04) 
Chairman Characteristics      
Academic (0,1)  0.028 
(0.31) 
-0.006 
(-0.06) 
-0.037 
(-0.36) 
-0.028 
(-0.27) 
Additional directorships (0,1)  0.528*** 
(2.95) 
0.583*** 
(3.82) 
0.564*** 
(3.43) 
0.560*** 
(3.38) 
Age (0,1)  0.054 
(0.63) 
0.040 
(0.51) 
0.074 
(0.88) 
0.077 
(0.90) 
External director with industry experience (0,1)  0.125 
(0.94) 
0.009 
(0.07) 
-0.118 
(-0.89) 
-0.121 
(-0.91) 
Founder (0,1)  0.100 
(0.65) 
 
0.125 
(0.83) 
-0.030 
(-0.19) 
-0.031 
(-0.20) 
Gender (0,1)  -0.605*** 
(-2.68) 
 
-0.249 
(-0.93) 
-0.217 
(0.83) 
-0.221 
(-0.84) 
International education (0,1)  -0.074 
(-0.88) 
0.014 
(0.16) 
-0.057 
(-0.62) 
-0.054 
(-0.58) 
International experience (0,1)  0.020 
0.27 
 
0.095 
(1.19) 
0.103 
(1.38) 
0.101 
(1.34) 
Previous executive (0,1)  0.273** 
2.43 
 
0.075 
(0.51) 
-0.005 
(-0.04) 
-0.007 
(-0.05) 
Substantial equity ownership (0,1)  0.359** 
2.39 
0.075 
(0.51) 
0.035 
(0.24) 
-0.041 
(-0.29) 
Chairman tenure  0.014 
(1.34) 
0.023* 
(1.74) 
0.024* 
(1.68) 
0.024* 
(1.65) 
Corporate Governance Characteristics      
Anglo American (0,1)   0.128 
(1.28) 
0.175 
(1.61) 
0.175 
(1.62) 
Board size   0.031** 
(2.44) 
0.024* 
(1.93) 
0.024* 
(1.92) 
Busy (0,1)   -0.077 
(-0.80) 
0.087 
(0.90) 
0.087 
(0.90) 
CEO tenure   0.005 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(0.15) 
Financial industry knowledge (0,1)   -0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.049 
(-0.58) 
-0.044 
(-0.53) 
Internationals   -0.223 
(-0.51) 
-0.591 
(-1.42) 
-0.600 
(-1.45) 
No major shareholder (0,1)   0.098 
(0.91) 
0.065 
(0.59) 
0.059 
(0.53) 
Major shareholder 5-25% (0,1)   0.116 
(1.28) 
0.070 
(0.77) 
0.066 
(0.72) 
Major shareholder 25-50% (0,1)   -0.081 
(-0.61) 
-0.106 
(-0.80) 
-0.108 
(-0.80) 
Variable compensation quotient   0.628*** 
(5.23) 
0.611*** 
(4.94) 
0.610*** 
(4.93) 
Firm Characteristics      
Employees (ln)    0.052 
(1.34) 
0.052 
(1.34) 
Investment activities    -0.723 
(-0.68) 
-0.759 
(-071) 
Leverage    -0.388 
(-1.11) 
-0.386 
(-1.12) 
Risk    -0.032* 
(-1.73) 
-0.021* 
(-1.72) 
Tobin's q    0.071 
(1.22) 
0.066 
(1.11) 
Remuneration in Crisis      
Crisis (0,1)     -0.037 
(-0.61) 
Constant 5.311*** 
(5.15) 
4.655*** 
(4.89) 
4.643*** 
(4.49) 
4.781*** 
(4.32) 
4.876*** 
(4.38) 
N 260 260 260 257 257 
Adjusted R-sq 0.199 0.272 0.392 0.404 0.402 
The table shows the results of the estimation of the pooled OLS in columns 1-5. The dependent variable for each estimation is the natural logarithm of Chairman 
compensation for the year t. The independent Variable CEO compensation is lagged by one year. The level of statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is 
denoted with ***,** and * respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All estimations include robust standard errors. 
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4.1.2 Fixed Effects Regression 
As explained above, our results and conclusions are based on the fixed effects model as this is 
in line with the common approach on panel data (Brooks, 2014). Our econometric approach is 
the same as in the case of the pooled regression except of the exclusion of two control variables 
(External director with industry experience and Founder) due to their high correlation. The 
OLS model is based on Regression (1). The forward stepwise approach is used again. At first 
we take a look at the direct relationship between the CEO compensation and Chairman 
compensation. The results provide a strong support for a positive relationship between the two. 
The coefficient of 0.34 is significant at the 1% level. The adjusted R-squared of 0.54 indicates 
that the fixed effects model does have a better fit than the pooled one with an adjusted R-squared 
of 0.20 (Brooks, 2014).  
Following the stepwise approach we add the Chairman Characteristics into our model. There is 
again a significant positive relationship between CEO compensation and Chairman 
compensation (0.31) at the 1% level. The only control variable that has an influence on 
Chairman compensation is Substantial equity ownership (-0.29). This is contradictory to our 
expectation. According to this outcome, a chairman with substantial equity ownership cannot 
use or does not want to use its power to raise his remuneration. The adjusted R-squared stays 
constant at 0.54. 
In the third model we add the Corporate Governance Characteristics control group. The results 
show again a significant positive relationship between CEO compensation and Chairman 
compensation (0.33) at the 1% level. Substantial equity ownership keeps its negative influence 
(-0.37). Out of the ten governance criteria only two have a significant influence on the 
dependent variable. CEO tenure has a positive impact on chairman remuneration (0.02), which 
is in line with the expectations. The other significant variable is the Variable compensation 
quotient (0.40). This indicates that if the variable percentage of total compensation rises, total 
Chairman compensation rises. That effect was also expected since a rise in variable 
compensation indicates that the firm is performing well, therefore it is legitimate that the 
chairman will also get a slice of the cake in line with agency theory (2.3.1 PRINCIPLES AND 
ELEMENTS OF COMPENSATION). By including the second control group, the R-squared rises to 
0.56, indicating that the fit of the model is slightly higher if Corporate Governance 
Characteristics are controlled for. 
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The fourth model incorporates firm individualities into the regression. Just like before, CEO 
compensation has a positive significant effect on the 1% level (0.35). Substantial equity 
ownership is again having a negative influence on the compensation (-0.46) but only at the 10% 
level. A rise in variable compensation keeps its positive impact on total Chairman 
compensation (0.44). Regarding Firm Characteristics, only Leverage has a significant impact. 
A higher level of firm leverage reduces Chairman compensation (-1.36). This is in line with 
our expectations; through higher leverage a lower need for monitoring by the chairman is 
needed as the creditors act as a monitoring institution already (2.4.2 CHARACTERISTICS). 
In the last model we include the dummy to control for the possible effects of the financial crisis 
on Chairman compensation. Model five is used to draw our final conclusions. CEO 
compensation has a significantly positive effect on Chairman compensation (0.33) at the 1% 
level. Also Academic, Anglo American and the Variable compensation quotient have a positive 
effect on the compensation of chairmen of the DAX30. The remuneration is influenced 
negatively by a rise in Board size (-0.04). This is against our expectations as we anticipated that 
a rising board size enhances coordination efforts and therefore a higher remuneration is paid to 
the chairman. Our results predict the contrary though, which could be explained by the 
argument that the lower effectiveness and increased number of remunerated members can lead 
to a lower compensation. In model five also a rise in Leverage has a negative impact (-1.40) on 
Chairman compensation. The results show that the Crisis had a negative impact on Chairman 
compensation as anticipated (-0.11). This is in line with a PwC study (Hösch, 2010). 
Concluding it can be said that in all four control groups we find significant variables but most 
of the variables we considered to influence Chairman compensation are not significant. Of the 
26 variables that we control for only seven show a significant influence in the end. Nevertheless 
we come to the conclusion that our Hypothesis 1 ‘there is a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and chairman compensation’ gets supported. Hypothesis 3, ‘there is a significant 
impact of the financial crisis on chairman compensation’, gets also supported. The financial 
crisis had a statistically significant influence on chairman remuneration.  
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression on Chairman compensate 
  
Fixed Effects OLS estimation of Chairman compensation 2006- 2014 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Chairman compensation (ln) 
Independent variable      
CEO compensation (ln) 0.342*** 0.308*** 0.333*** 0.347*** 0.331*** 
 (4.98) (3.91) (4.21) (4.48) (4.06) 
Chairman Characteristics      
Academic (0,1)  0.137 0.137 0.140 0.176* 
  (1.37) (1.15) (1.28) (1.65) 
Additional directorships (0,1)  -0.034 -0.054 0.006 -0.006 
  (-0.16) (-0.27) (0.03) (-0.03) 
Age (0,1)  -0.020 0.022 0.053 0.049 
  (-0.19) (0.22) (0.51) (0.48) 
Gender (0,1)  0.165 0.384 0.254 0.270 
  (0.78) (1.59) (0.98) (0.97) 
International education (0,1)  0.009 0.100 0.090 0.111 
  (0.08) 0.92) (0.75) (0.93) 
International experience (0,1)  0.011 -0.018 -0.043 -0.048 
  (0.14) (-0.20) (-0.44) (-0.51) 
Previous executive (0,1)  0.028 -0.004 0.094 0.116 
  (0.16) (-0.02) (0.58) (0.73) 
Substantial equity ownership (0,1)  -0.294** -0.368** 
 
-0.458* -0.399 
  (-2.16) (-2.32) (-1.83) (-1.60) 
Chairman tenure  0.021 0.017 0.018 0.018 
  (1.48) (1.19) (1.46) (1.47) 
Corporate Governance Characteristics      
Anglo American (0,1)   0.224 0.207 0.217* 
   (1.64) (1.60) (1.76) 
Board size   -0.030 -0.032 -0.039* 
   (-1.22) (-1.37) (-1.75) 
Busy (0,1)   0.048 0.115 0.105 
   (0.40) (0.88) (0.80) 
CEO tenure   0.024* 0.020 0.020 
   (1.80) (1.53) (1.57) 
Financial industry knowledge (0,1)   -0.019 -0.033 -0.007 
   (-0.19) (-0.31) (-0.07) 
Internationals   -0.253 -0.463 -0.507 
   (-0.43) (-0.75) (-0.84) 
No major shareholder (0,1)   0.076 0.058 0.013 
   (0.60) (0.50) (0.11) 
Major shareholder 5-25% (0,1)   -0.012 -0.021 -0.062 
   (-0.12) (-0.22) (-0.62) 
Major shareholder 25-50% (0,1)   0.129 0.165 0.185 
   (0.67) (0.90) (1.01) 
Variable compensation quotient    0.397** 0.442*** 0.444*** 
   (2.48) (2.76) (2.78) 
Firm Characteristics      
Investment activities    1.088 0.668 
    (0.96) (0.60) 
Leverage    -1.361** -1.396** 
    (-2.20) (-2.35) 
Risk    0.018 
 
0.017 
    (1.40) 
0 
(1.35) 
Size (ln)    0.223 0.200 
    (1.57) (1.43) 
Tobin's q    0.076 0.024 
    (-0.71) 
 
(-0.22) 
Remuneration in Crisis      
Crisis (0,1)     -0.109* 
     (-1.88) 
Constant 7.202*** 7.568*** 7.333*** 3.186 4.091 
 (6.89) (6.78) 5.80 (1.20) 
 
(1.46) 
N 260 260 260 257 257 
Adjusted R-sq 0.540 0.536 0.555 0.576 0.581 
The table shows the results of the estimation of the pooled OLS in columns 1-5. The dependent variable for each estimation is the natural logarithm of Chairman 
compensation for the year t. The independent Variable CEO compensation is lagged by one year. The level of statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level is 
denoted with ***,** and * respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All estimations include robust standard errors. 
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4.2 Empirical Results: Fixed vs. Variable Chairman 
Compensation 
4.2.1 Fixed Compensation 
This section is dedicated to test upon Hypothesis 2. Using Regressions (2) and (3) we estimate 
the relationship between Fixed chairman compensation and Fixed CEO compensation by taking 
into consideration our control groups. For consistency and comparative purposes we also 
conduct an OLS regression on the relationship between Variable chairman compensation and 
Variable CEO compensation. We start of by interpreting the fixed effects model of the 
regression as this has proven to be the right econometric approach again. Furthermore there is 
no pooled OLS research conducted on this topic before to compare with.  
Once again we take a forward stepwise approach with the same control groups as before. Due 
to multicollinearity issues we exclude Employees and Tangible assets from our original pool of 
variables. The results for the first model show a positive relationship (0.55) between Fixed CEO 
compensation and Fixed chairman compensation at the 1% level. The model already has a good 
fit with an adjusted R-squared of 0.48. Adding the control group Chairman Characteristics 
shows that the Fixed CEO compensation keeps its positive (0.45) significant impact. 
Furthermore chairman Age (0.30), Gender (1.33) and International experience (0.24) have a 
positive impact on the fixed chairman remuneration. The other variables are not significant. 
The adjusted R-squared is at 0.50.  
The results for the third group show again a positive correlation between the two compensation 
figures (0.34). Regarding Chairman Characteristics out of the nine variables only Gender stays 
significant and has a positive impact (0.49) on Fixed chairman compensation. Four out of the 
eleven Corporate Governance controls show a statistically significant impact on the dependent 
variable. Board Size has a slightly negative (-0.05) impact, indicating that an additional board 
member results in lower fixed chairman salary. The CEO tenure has a slightly positive (0.04) 
impact, indicating that the longer the CEO is in place, the higher the Fixed chairman 
compensation will be. In the case of a major shareholder being present, holding 5-25% of the 
company’s stock, a negative (-0.30) impact is observed. A rise in the Variable compensation 
quotient results in lower Fixed chairman compensation (-1.47) if the variable part of 
supervisory board compensation rises, the chairman fixed compensation declines. This effect 
is quite obvious as the chairman is part of the supervisory board. Whenever the remuneration 
is drawn towards a higher flexible portion, the fixed portion will decline. The fit of our model 
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increases by including the second control group, the adjusted R-squared jumps from 0.50 to 
0.68. 
In the next step we include Firm Characteristics. The relationship between the two 
compensation figures stays the same (0.29). Regarding Chairman Characteristics, Gender does 
not have a statistically significant impact anymore while Academic (0.24), International 
education (0.19) and Substantial equity ownership (-0.25) are significant on the 10% level. This 
indicates that chairmen with an academic title and an international education get a higher fixed 
compensation. A substantial equity ownership reduces remuneration though. In the Corporate 
Governance control group the results show four significant variables. The variables CEO 
tenure, Major shareholder 5-25% and Variable compensation quotient have the same impact 
as in model three. Board size is not significant in the fourth model, Internationals becomes 
significant though. A higher amount of internationals on the board has a negative impact (-1.75) 
on Fixed chairman compensation. The only Firm characteristic that is statistically significant 
is Sales, it can be disregarded though as it does not show an economic significance. Including 
the third control group brings us to an even higher fit, the adjusted R-squared is at 0.71. 
The final step in our forward stepwise approach is to control for the crisis. We use this model 
to draw final conclusions on fixed chairmen salaries. First of all our results show a significant 
positive influence of Fixed CEO compensation on Fixed chairman compensation (0.28) at the 
1% level. Two variables regarding the personality of the chairman have a significant impact as 
well. Academic (0.26) and International education (0.20) have a positive influence on fixed 
compensation. There are four Corporate Governance Characteristics with significant influence. 
Chairman compensation is negatively affected by a rise in Internationals on the board (-1.67), 
a major shareholder holding between 5-25% of the company’s stocks (-0.25) and a rise in the 
proportion of variable to total compensation (-1.47). A rise in fixed compensation is triggered 
by a rising CEO tenure (0.04). The control group Firm Characteristics has no influence since 
none of the variables shows statistical and economic significance. The crisis resulted in a lower 
Fixed chairman compensation (-0,01). The adjusted R-squared is at 0.71.  
Overall we can conclude that Hypothesis 2 gets supported, ‘there is a positive relationship 
between Fixed CEO compensation and Fixed chairman compensation’. In the next step we take 
a look at the variable compensation parts for consistency and comparative purposes.   
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Regression: Fixed Chairman compensation 
  
Fixed Effects OLS estimation of Fixed chairman compensation 2006-2014 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fixed chairman compensation (ln) 
Independent variable      
Fixed CEO compensation (ln) 0.553*** 0.451*** 0.342*** 0.294*** 0.283*** 
 (5.08) (3.81) (4.04) (3.71) (3.50) 
Chairman Characteristics      
Academic (0,1)  0.057 0.180 0.235* 0.256** 
  (0.38) (1.47) (1.92) (2.14) 
Additional directorships (0,1)  -0.038 -0.028 0.129 0.109 
  (-0.17) (-0.12) (0.41) (0.34) 
Age (0,1)  0.301** 0.120 0.164 0.162 
  (2.43) (1.12) (1.53) (1.53) 
Gender (0,1)  1.325*** 0.486* 0.342 0.376 
  (5.11) (1.75) (1.10) 81.17) 
International education (0,1)  0.157 0.147 0.187* 0.203* 
  (1.31) (1.46) (1.68) (1.82) 
International experience (0,1)  0.237* -0.056 -0.079 -0.084 
  (1.85) (-0.54) (-0.71) (-0.77) 
Previous executive (0,1)  -0.074 -0.204 -0.162 -0.135 
  (-0.38) (-1.31) (-1.04) (-0.85) 
Substantial equity ownership (0,1)  0.058 -0.254 -0.410* -0.346 
  (0.31) (-1.41) (-1.95) (-1.54) 
Chairman tenure  0.012 0.020 0.016 0.017 
  (0.57) (1.50) (1.32) (1.38) 
Corporate Governance Characteristics      
Anglo American (0,1)   0.185 0.177 0.186 
   (1.44) (1.40) (1.51) 
Board compensation (ln)   0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.00) (0.11) (0.14) 
Board size   -0.053* -0.028 -0.038 
   (-1.91) (-1.15) (-1.54) 
Busy (0,1)   0.013 0.109 0.097 
   (0.11) (0.91 (0.78) 
CEO tenure   0.042*** 0.043*** 0.042* 
   (3.27) (3.60) (3.60) 
Financial industry knowledge (0,1)   0.061 -0.011 0.020 
   (0.52) (-0.10) (0.18) 
Internationals   -0.754 -1.711** -1.666** 
   (-1.08) (-2.42) (-2.37) 
No major shareholder (0,1)   -0.216 -0.096 -0.147 
   (-1.59) (-0.75) (-1.14) 
Major shareholder 5-25% (0,1)   -0.300*** -0.208** -0.248*** 
   (-2.73) (-2.30) (-2.69) 
Major shareholder 25-50% (0,1)   -0.194 -0.021 -0.010 
   (-1.00) (-0.12) (-0.06) 
Variable compensation quotient   -1.474*** -1.476*** -1.469** 
   (-8.53) (-8.66) (-8.59) 
Firm Characteristics      
Investment activities    0.395 0.037 
    (0.26) (0.02) 
Leverage    -0.235 -0.274 
    (-0.43) (-0.52) 
Risk    0.020 0.021 
    (1.48) (1.55) 
Sales (ln)    0.000*** 0.000*** 
    (5.34) (4.63) 
Size (ln)    0.000 0.000 
    (0.02) (0.13) 
Tobin's q    0.075 0.033 
    (0.90) (0.41) 
Remuneration in Crisis      
Crisis (0,1)     -0.096* 
     (-1.63) 
Constant 3.968** 5.017**** 8.101*** 7.471*** 7.928*** 
 (2.56) (3.05) (6.59) (6.00) (6.03) 
N 259 259 259 256 256 
Adjusted R-sq 0.477 0.502 
 
0.681 
 
0.711 
 
0.713 
 
The table shows the results of the estimation of the fixed effects OLS in columns 1-5. The dependent variable for each estimation is the natural logarithm of Fixed 
chairman compensation for the year t. The independent variable Fixed CEO compensation is lagged by one year. The level of statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level is denoted with ***,** and * respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All estimations include robust standard errors. 
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4.2.2 Variable Compensation 
Besides the fixed compensation part, Chairmen of DAX30 companies often receive a variable, 
success related compensation. Although this variable part of the compensation was reduced 
during the crisis (Hösch, 2010) and is being reduced more and more (Kasper & Hönsch, 2012) 
it is still value adding to take a closer look at it and compare the outcomes to the ones of the 
fixed compensation.  
The research approach is exactly the same as before. An OLS regression is conducted with 
Variable chairman compensation being the dependent variable. Due to multicollinearity issues 
the variables Variable compensation quotient, Employees and Investment activities are 
excluded from the regression.  
The results of this regression are rather surprising. There is no significant relationship between 
Variable chairman compensation and Variable CEO compensation. Nevertheless, nine control 
variables have a statistic and economic impact. An increase in Academic, Busy, Financial 
Industry knowledge, Leverage, Tobin’s q and the presence of the financial Crisis yields in a 
higher variable compensation. On the other side, a chairman being female and the presence of 
major shareholders yields to a lower variable compensation. Most of the results of the controls 
are in line with the expectations. The most obvious is the better the firm performs the higher 
the compensation (Tobin’s q). The sign of Crisis is surprising though as we expected a lower 
variable compensation in times of economic turbulences and since fixed compensation is 
decreasing during a crisis. One explanation for this could be that it is especially important to 
have a thorough monitoring body in times of economic downturns. To make sure that this gets 
achieved incentivizing the chairman by a higher variable compensation element might be wise. 
This element could be related to monitoring performance of the supervisory board instead of 
firm performance. The significance of Crisis is challenged in 4.4.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. 
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Table 5: Fixed Effects Regression: Variable Chairman compensation 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects OLS estimation of Variable chairman compensation 2006-2014 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Variable chairman compensation (ln) 
Independent variable      
Variable CEO compensation (ln) 0.370** 0.351* 0.225 0.247 0.311 
 (2.04) (1.75) (0.92) (1.03) (1.31) 
Chairman Characteristics      
Academic (0,1)  6.468 6.205 7.776** 7.063* 
  (1.30) (1.46) (1.98) (1.76) 
Additional directorships (0,1)  0.387 -3.909 -2.668 -1.921 
  (0.09) (-0.87) (-0.62) (-0.48) 
Age (0,1)  -4.201 -3.903 -3.783 -3.583 
  (-1.37) (-1.30) (-1.31) (-1.20) 
Gender (0,1)  -30.325*** -25.509*** -25.225** -26.496** 
  (-2.85) (-2.45) (-2.28) (-2.49) 
International education (0,1)  -7.441* -6.241* -4.769 -5.495 
  (-1.90) (-1.68) (-1.32) (-1.52) 
International experience (0,1)  -9.606** -2.993 -1.809 -1.432 
  (-2.33) (-0.62) (-0.40) (-0.31) 
Previous executive (0,1)  -6.038 -2.926 -2.864 -3.865 
  (-1.27) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.80) 
Substantial equity ownership (0,1)  -4.177 -2.178 -7.078 -9.726 
  (-1.27) (-0.48) (-1.03) (-1.34) 
Chairman tenure  0.054 0.177 0.320 0.319 
  (0.12) (0.40) (0.69) (0.69) 
Corporate Governance Characteristics      
Anglo American (0,1)   -1.129 -1.285 -1.707 
   (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.36) 
Board compensation (ln)   0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 
   (1.96) (2.02) (1.73) 
Board size   -0.432 -0.438 -0.009 
   (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.01) 
Busy (0,1)   8.019* 6.333 6.884* 
   (1.91) (1.47) (1.65) 
CEO tenure   -0.025 0.228 0.256 
   (-0.06) (0.54) (0.60) 
Financial industry knowledge (0,1)   6.423** 8.528** 7.134** 
   (2.07) (2.58) (2.18) 
Internationals   -50.698** -34.829 -35.082 
   (-2.00) (-1.29) (-1.29) 
No major shareholder (0,1)   -3.627 -4.036 -2.213 
   (-0.66) (-0.74) (-0.37) 
Major shareholder 5-25% (0,1)   -12.137*** -11.985*** -10.334** 
   (-3.00) (-3.17) (-2.51) 
Major shareholder 25-50% (0,1)   -18.528*** -15.876*** -16.144*** 
   (-3.25) (-2.85) (-2.75) 
Firm Characteristics      
Investment activities    29.939 42.687 
    (0.71) (1.03) 
Leverage    34.028** 35.490** 
    (2.16) (2.27) 
Risk    0.732 0.710 
    (1.30) (1.28) 
Sales (ln)    0.000 0.000 
    (-0.48) (0.11) 
Size (ln)    0.000 0.000 
    (-1.20) (-1.36) 
Tobin's q    9.003*** 10.604*** 
    (2.66) (3.09) 
Remuneration in Crisis      
Crisis (0,1)     3.803* 
     (1.83) 
Constant -5.814** 0.808 14.033 -14.230 -28.752 
 (-2.31) (0.10) (0.81) (-0.70) (-1.29) 
N 254 254 254 251 251 
Adjusted R-sq 0.375 0.407 0.463 0.479 0.486 
The table shows the results of the estimation of the fixed effects OLS in columns 1-5. The dependent variable for each estimation is the natural logarithm of Variable 
 chairman compensation for the year t. The independent variable Variable CEO compensation is lagged by one year. The level of statistical significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% level is denoted with ***,** and * respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All estimations include robust standard errors 
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4.3 Discussion 
In this study we took various empirical approaches to investigate on possible cronyism between 
the chairmen and the CEOs of German DAX30 companies. The foundation of this research 
ground on the principal agent theory. In the first step a pooled OLS regression was conducted 
to compare it to the outcomes of Oxelheim & Clarkson’s study (2014) on the Swedish market. 
The comparison shows that various variables that are significant for the Swedish market are not 
significant in the German study. These are regarding the fact if the CEO is on the board (not 
possible in Germany), chairman age, Chairman tenure, previous involvement in the firm, 
international experience and voting power of the chairman and of the largest shareholder. In 
Germany significant influence factors on Chairman compensation that are not relevant in 
Sweden are additional directorships, the Variable compensation quotient and the Risk of the 
firm. Three variables are relevant in both countries. CEO compensation is highly significant; 
the coefficients are even the same (0.38). Chairman tenure is also important in both markets. 
A higher tenure has a negative effect on remuneration in Sweden whereas in Germany the 
relation is contrary. A higher Board size has a positive effect in both markets, contrary to Ryan 
& Wiggins (2004) findings.  
Concluding, the comparison shows that there are some similarities in determinants of chairman 
compensation between the two countries, especially the same impact of a rise in CEO 
compensation is remarkable. Nevertheless even this result and a positive influence was 
expected in both cases. Since there is quite a variation in the impact of the control variables 
though we conclude that the determinants of chairman compensation are different in both 
countries. This does not facilitate to draw interferences of cronyism.  
To draw a conclusion if cronyism also exists in the German market we extended the original 
approach and conducted the analysis controlling for fixed effects. The results show a positive 
relation between CEO and Chairman compensation. Furthermore compensation rises if the 
chairman has an academic background and if at least one Anglo-American is on the board. 
Compensation decreases in an increase of the board size and in leverage. A rise in the proportion 
of variable to fixed compensation increases overall compensation. This indicates that if the firm 
is doing well, the compensation will rise. The significantly negative impact of the crisis fits into 
that picture. In times of uncertain economic prospects the chairman compensation reacts 
appropriately and decreases. Both outcomes contradict the idea of cronyism as we expect that 
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one sign for cronyism would be a rising compensation in states of poor economic performance 
as well.  
The presence of cronyism is also contradicted by the non-significance of the cronyism related 
variables Previous executive, Chairman tenure, CEO tenure, Size and Tobin’s q (3.3.4 
CRONYISM EFFECTS). Especially the insignificance of Previous executive is notable as this 
variable has a significant positive influence in the Swedish case and the conclusion on the 
existence of cronyism in Sweden drawn by Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014) is based on this.  
In the Swedish approach, the variable part of compensation is proxied by a rise in CEO 
remuneration since chairman compensation is not split into a success and non-success related 
part. In Germany the variable and the fixed parts get disclosed, therefore we conducted two 
additional regressions to test for the determinants of fixed and variable chairman compensation. 
The outcomes for the fixed part regression show that chairman compensation is determined by 
eight variables. Compensation is positively affected by a rise in Fixed CEO compensation, 
Academic, International education and CEO tenure. Internationals, Major shareholder 5-25%, 
Variable compensation quotient and Crisis have a negative impact. Compared to the 
determinants of total compensation we observe a disparity to fixed compensation. The fixed 
part is influenced by the international education of the chairman, the tenure of the CEO and the 
presence of a major shareholder. These determinants are not significant for the total 
compensation though. In turn, the total compensation is influenced by an Anglo-American on 
the board, the size of the board and the leverage ratio of the firm. These variables do not affect 
the fixed compensation. To conclude, one can say that the total compensation is stronger 
influenced by board characteristics and also firm characteristics which do not influence the 
fixed part at all. Regarding our suspicion of cronyism we do not find much proof in the fixed 
compensation part as well. The cronyism related variables Previous executive, Chairman 
tenure, Sales, Size and Tobin’s q are not significant. Only CEO tenure has a minor positive 
impact at the 10% level. The outcome can be interpreted in connection with stewardship theory 
according to which chairmen get paid for filling out the ‘honorable’ stewards monitoring role 
(2.3.1 PRINCIPLES & ELEMENTS OF COMPENSATION). To come to a robust conclusion about the 
presence of cronyism we look at the variable compensation in the fourth step. 
Variable Chairman compensation is determined by Academic, Gender, Busy, Financial 
industry knowledge, Major shareholder 5-25%, Major shareholder 25-50%, Risk, Tobin’s q 
and Crisis. It is notable that the independent variable Variable CEO compensation has no 
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significant impact. The results also show that the variable part of the salary is influenced by a 
different set of variables than the fixed part. Three significant variables regarding variable 
compensation are also impacting the fixed part (Academic, Major shareholder 5-25% and 
Crisis) while six are only relevant for the variable part. The results show that the crisis had 
different effects on the compensation components. While fixed compensation decreased, 
variable compensation increased. This outcome is not as anticipated. We expected to see a 
decreasing variable compensation during the crisis due to bad firm performance. The contrary 
is the case, indicating that the variable part of chairman compensation is not necessarily only 
tied to firm performance but also other factors that might be chairman specific. High variable 
compensation could also be explained through arguing that the incentives for the supervisory 
board were set higher because the management and shareholders perceived the monitoring task 
as more demanding in times of the financial crisis. This argumentation would be in line with 
agency theory (2.3.1 PRINCIPLES & ELEMENTS OF COMPENSATION). A rising remuneration in 
times of crises could definitely be an indicator of cronyism. On the other hand none of the six 
cronyism related variables in this case (Previous executive, Chairman tenure, CEO tenure, 
Sales, Size and Tobin’s q) indicate cronyism.  
Due to all the points mentioned above, we conclude that our results do not support a strong 
relationship that is characterized by cronyism between the chairmen and CEO’s of the DAX30 
companies. Nevertheless the tendency in the German market to put emphasis on a higher fixed 
compensation part can indicate a cronyism-characterized relationship in the future.  
In our study we tested upon three hypotheses. The results confirm all of them. We conclude 
that there is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and chairman compensation. 
Furthermore we see a positive relationship between fixed CEO compensation and fixed 
chairman compensation. Our research also confirms a significant impact of the financial crisis 
on chairman compensation. 
4.4 Robustness, Validity & Reliability 
4.4.1 Data Reliability 
In our first approach we considered a couple of additional variables to include into our analysis 
on determinants of chairman compensation.  First of all we took into consideration the fraction 
of employee representatives on the board. Since the German Code obliges the DAX companies 
to have 50% of the board members to be employee representatives we decided to drop the 
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variable since it would not yield any result. Nevertheless this variable has to be considered in 
future research in other markets. 
Another variable that we considered to be important but excluded later concerns major CEO 
equity ownership. We anticipate that chairman compensation could be affected by a CEO 
owning a substantial part of the company. This is not present in any DAX company, therefore 
the variable got excluded. In future research the variable has to be kept in mind though, when 
looking at listed family firms for example this variable can become crucial. 
The impacts of two variables, which we used have to be considered carefully due to few 
observations. Regarding chairman Substantial equity ownership, only in few cases chairmen 
actually owned a significant portion of the company. The variable has also proven to be 
insignificant in every model. The value for Gender is one in only six out of the 270 observations. 
The only company to have a female chairman in our sample is Henkel. Therefore the validity 
of the variable can be questioned. Nevertheless it is significant in regarding variable 
compensation.  
As already outlined above, since some of our variables are logged, while others are not and 
others are dummies, the interpretation has to be considered carefully. We logged some of our 
variables to account for non-normality issues and to retrieve more significant outcomes.  
To increase the degrees of freedom some unknown values (#na) were imputed with a traditional 
imputation technique. To address this issue the missing data were first of all classified as 
missing at random (independent from missing values but depended on observed variables). 
Therefore a mean value imputation, a form of single imputation was conducted by using the 
arithmetic mean of growth (excel formula: average) to replace the missing value with an 
approximated value (Uni Köln, 2015). A proxy of the depended variable “chairman 
compensation” was generated for the following companies (years): Fresenius Medical Care 
(2006), Heidelberg Cement (2009), Merck (2006, 2007, 2008). Furthermore values were 
imputed for the independent variable “CEO compensation” for the following firms (years) were 
generated: Beiersdorf (2006), Daimler (2006), Fresenius (2006), Fresenius Medical Care 
(2006), Henkel (2006), K+S (2006), Linde (2006). The imputation of the independent variable 
was not done for Merck and Heidelberg Cement because there were too many data points 
missing for applying a feasible imputation method. Merck was registered as a DAX30 company 
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in 2007 and Heidelberg Cement in 2010. Due to the fact that at that time there were no 
obligation to publish the information for individual persons.5 
4.4.2 Econometric Model and OLS Assumptions 
We regard the quality of the data as a good foundation for our regressions. To make sure that 
our data and the results of our performed regressions are reliable and a valid interpretation is 
possible, we control for the five OLS assumptions presented in the table below. The 
assumptions matter for the study as our outcomes rely on testing H0 Hypotheses based on t-
statistics. Since the interpretation of the t-statistic depends on the standard errors we want to 
guarantee robustness.  
Table 6: OLS Assumptions & Problems 
*Source: Brooks (2014) 
The results of the performed regressions all do have an intercept, so we assume that assumption 
one is not violated and we have zero mean across all error terms. Assumption two is requiring 
a constant variance of all error terms. If this assumption does not hold, heteroscedasticity can 
be assumed. To control for possible heteroscedasticity we included heteroscedastic robust 
                                                 
5 The same method was applied for doing the imputation of the fixed salaries. Also the same year’s data were unknown. 
Notation / Name Description Test 
𝑬 (𝜺𝒕) = 𝟎 Mean is 0 across all error terms No test needed 
𝑽𝒂𝒓 (𝜺𝒕) = 𝝈
𝟐 <  ∞ 
Heteroscedasticity 
Constant variance of error terms 
Graphical Depiction; White, Breusch-Pagan, 
Godfrey, Goldfeld-Quant 
𝑪𝒐𝒗 (𝜺𝒊, 𝜺𝒋) = 𝟎 
Autocorrelation 
Covariance between cross sectional error terms is 
0 Breusch-Godfrey, Durbin-Watson 
𝑪𝒐𝒗 (𝜺𝒊, 𝒙𝒊) = 𝟎 
Endogeneity 
No relationship between error-term and 
corresponding explanatory variable Hausman 
𝜺𝒕 − 𝑵(𝟎, 𝝈
𝟐) 
Non-Normality 
Error terms are normally distributed 
Jarque-Bera test 
Multicollinearity High correlation among explanatory variables. Correlation Matrix 
Non-Linearity 
Linear relationship among explanatory and 
corresponding variable. 
Squared Variables 
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standard errors through the function of white ‘diagonal’ in EViews. This is a common method 
in corporate governance panel data estimations according to our supervisors.  
Assumption three shall prevent having biased regressions through autocorrelation and demands 
uncorrelated residuals in the regressions. The Durbin-Watson test for each regression showed 
that we do not have severe autocorrelation problems, the DW stats were all around 2.  
The fourth OLS assumptions shall prevent endogeneity and demands an explanatory variable, 
which is not correlated with the error term. Violating this assumption can have severe effects 
and lead to biased coefficients. Endogeneity can be caused by omitted variables (OV) and 
measurement errors (ME) and is a common problem in corporate governance panel data 
(Andreas, 2011). According to Oxelheim (2014)6 estimation problems are created when 
‘governance choices are made on the basis of the unobservable correlated with the error term 
in the estimated regression’ and the structures ‘(…) arise endogenously because economic 
actors choose them in response to the governance issue they face’. When analyzing the structure 
and causality issues, endogeneity is a major obstacle. Since we deal with a supervisory board 
issue we have to pay attention to endogeneity. As a problem of a reverse causality, we could 
assume that an increase in firm performance incorporated in control group Firm characteristics 
determining Chairman compensation can also be influenced by a good monitoring by the 
chairman (i.e. prevented self-utilization of executives and fulfilled overall business strategy) 
can lead to a higher firm performance itself. 
In this study we tried to cope with OVs by including all the important variables and controls 
determined in previous research (2.5 EMPIRICAL DETERMINANTS OF SUPERVISORY BOARD 
REMUNERATION & 3.3 VARIABLES) and already used proxies to prevent MEs. Most proxies 
were retrieved from annual reports and Datastream. A ME is occurring often if the proxy is not 
referring to the true value, just giving an approximation.  Nevertheless, as mentioned above, 
Datastream and annual reports can be assessed as a high quality data resource.  
The last OLS assumption states that the error terms shall be normally distributed. To deal with 
non-normality we chose to multiply numerous variables with the natural logarithm. 
Furthermore due to our sample size, non-normality is not an issue in our regressions. A violation 
                                                 
6 Strategic Corporate Finance Lecture by Lars Oxelheim on 20th November 2014. 
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of non-normality would be ‘inconsequential’ (Brooks, 2014:164) therefore. Due to the number 
of observations the ‘appropriate distribution’ will therefore be followed anyways. 
In Table A 9: Pooled OLS Regression: Correlation Matrix and  we present the correlations for 
our regressions. There is evidence for multi- and near collinearity as explained in 3.3.5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. This issue was captured by dropping variables, as recommended by 
Brooks (2014). 
Usually a model should also be free of non-linearity concerns. In regards of our sample size 
and amount of variables used, we agreed upon that a Ramsey RESET test or squaring our 
figures is not necessary7.  
To comment on the overall fit of the econometric model to the data, the adjusted R squared is 
used as it controls for additional variables. The outcomes show that we have a really good fit 
for panel data after controlling for multicollinearity. 
Even though we tried to solve for biases through OVs and MEs it is ‘unlikely’ that all sources 
of biases are captured, especially in a corporate governance topic. To investigate further on 
these topics one can introduce Instrumental Variables to deal with endogeneity. This concept 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis though. 
Regarding heterogeneity, as already explained in 3.4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH, we chose to 
use fixed effects models to control for heterogeneity issues.  
4.4.3 Sensivity Analysis 
In line with Oxelheim & Clarkson’s (2014) approach, we conduct a backwards stepwise OLS 
estimation regarding the as significant identified variables beforehand. This approach is 
controversially seen by statisticians since insignificant variables get excluded from the 
regression, which were identified to be important in the first place8. Nevertheless we included 
the outcomes in Tables A 16-18. Regarding our original fixed effects regression we can see that 
all the significant variables identified in the first regression are also significant with the same 
coefficient sign in the backwards approach. In the backwards approach for the fixed 
compensation we had to exclude International education and Internationals due to 
insignificance. In the second approach the coefficients of the variables kept their original sign. 
                                                 
7 Advice given by Naciye Sekerci on 6th of May 2015. 
8 Advice given by Naciye Sekerci on 6th of May 2015. 
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The outcome is quite astonishing as it shows that internationality might not have an impact on 
fixed compensation as concluded before. The backwards approach also shows that variables 
that were anticipated to be significant for the variable compensation are not significant anymore 
when excluding insignificant ones. These are Busy, Leverage and Crisis. The insignificance of 
crisis is interesting to see as it was regarded as an indicator of cronyism in 4.2.2 VARIABLE 
COMPENSATION. We concluded that cronyism is not present; this gets support by the 
insignificance of the crisis now.  
Regarding our stepwise forward approach, we decided to add the control groups Chairman 
Characteristics, Corporate Governance characteristics and Firm Characteristics one after the 
other. We decided upon that order due to our assessment of importance. This choice is quite 
subjective; a different one could have given us different outputs. Nevertheless the order does 
not change our conclusions, which are always based on the fifth model. 
To proxy for a possible cronyism between the chairman and the CEO, we constructed a tenure 
dummy that covers the years of collaboration between the two. In different scenarios we let the 
dummy take on the value of one if the collaboration has been for at least 3 years or 4 years 
respectively. The rationale behind that approach is that we anticipate a rising cronyism between 
the chairman and the CEO the longer they work together and thereby create a bond. This is 
important especially in the German case since boards are staggered, meaning that unlike in 
other countries, board members and chairmen are not (re)elected each year. A long-term 
relationship between the two institutions is therefore more likely than in other countries. 
Nevertheless, since the dummy turned out to be insignificant no matter which boundary was 
chosen we decided to exclude it and keep the original variables CEO tenure and Chairman 
tenure. The insignificance can be an indication of the absence of cronyism though. Another 
approach to capture the bonding between the CEO and the chairman would be to investigate 
upon their common backgrounds. For example one could investigate if they attended the same 
university, have the same heritage, are members of the same sports clubs etc. Based on that 
subjective judgment a dummy could be used signifying a significant bond. Since this approach 
would take a lot of effort and is in the end still based on subjective judgments we decided to 
rely on hard, comparable data. Nevertheless this approach could be an interesting topic for 
future research.   
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5 Conclusion 
The research question of this Master Thesis is concerned with the identification of the 
determinants of chairmen compensation in the German large cap market. We aimed to 
investigate if compensation is influenced by cronyism between the CEO and the chairman. To 
start off, we identified variables that we considered to be influential on chairman compensation 
by orienting on previous work in the field and taking into consideration the particularities of 
the German market. We created a database including the 30 DAX companies, observed over a 
nine year time period, totaling in 270 observations. For these we retrieved data on more than 
30 variables via scanning through annual reports, Internet research and retrieving data from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream and Eikon. By running several OLS regression we found out that 
chairman compensation is determined by the independent variable CEO compensation and 
several controls: the academic background of the chairman, the presence of Anglo-Americans 
on the board, the board size, the proportion of variable compensation in total compensation, the 
leverage ratio of the firm and the financial crisis. In our approach we tested upon three 
hypotheses and found out that they are true:  
1. There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and chairman compensation,  
2. There is a positive relationship between fixed CEO compensation and fixed chairman 
compensation 
3. There is a significant impact of the financial crisis on chairman compensation  
Regarding our initial suspicion of cronyism between the CEO and the chairman we came to the 
conclusion that this is most likely not the case in Germany, although we cannot be 100% sure, 
we find strong prove. This is based on the fact that almost all variables, which we considered 
to demonstrate cronyism, are insignificant in our regressions. This stands in contrast to the 
findings for the Swedish market. The diverging outcome can be explained by various 
differences between the German and the Swedish Corporate Governance Systems. First of all 
it is up to the shareholders to approve chairman compensation in the end. Although the 
proposals are rarely rejected there is still the possible force of the shareholders present in the 
remuneration setting process. Another reason for the absence of cronyism can lie in the German 
two-tier board structure and the clear separation between the two institutional bodies. 
Furthermore the fact that 50% of board members are employee representatives can also block 
possible cronyism in regards to remuneration, because it is against the employee’s interest that 
the chairman 
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gets over compensated. The employee representatives can be regarded as a very powerful 
institution therefore. Another reason for the absence of cronyism can lie in the fact that the 
chairman position is seen as an honorable ‘steward’ position in Germany. A chairman does not 
take on this position for monetary reasons but rather to ensure that the company is lead in the 
right way due to personal entrenchment and an emotional relationship with the firm. Taking 
this idea one step further, in regards of the chairman being a former management executive, 
one can imply that he earned a lot in his previous career. Therefore there is no need to rely on 
a high compensation. In some cases the job can be rather seen as a task that is fulfilled instead 
of retiring completely. 
Regarding implications for policymakers, we can conclude that the GCGC seems to have 
proven to prevent cronyism between the CEOs and chairmen of the DAX30 companies. 
Nevertheless our outcomes should not be interpreted in a way saying that cronyism is definitely 
not present between the two institutions. There might be factors indicating cronyism, which we 
did not include into our research. The tendency to enhance the focus on fixed compensation in 
Germany might bear the risk of stronger cronyism in the future.  
This thesis contributes to the current research in the field of corporate governance in various 
ways. The paper is the first one, according to our knowledge, to touch upon the determinants 
of German large cap chairman compensation and relates that to cronyism between the chairman 
and the CEO (Table A7: Matrix: Defining the Research Gap, corner c)). Research on 
supervisory boards is getting more and more important as the tasks for boards are becoming 
more complex, the personal responsibilities and the accountability of board members are also 
rising. Our paper is closing the research gap on cronyism in the German large cap market. It is 
not really clear though if these outcomes can be transmitted on to other German market 
segments like Small- and MidCap or the Tec market. To transfer our conclusions one would 
have to evaluate the explicit governance and ownership structures in these segments first. This 
could be a topic for future research. 
Other ideas for future research would be to investigate upon the determinants of chairman 
compensation in other Germanic shaped systems like Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands or 
Poland. Regarding our sample, an approach focused on qualitative research could add further 
value. One idea would be to conduct interviews directly with chairmen, CEOs and relevant 
stakeholders. Since there is a trend of increasing number of Anglo-Americans and 
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Internationals on boards, further research could investigate upon the distinct influence of 
internationalization and cronyism effects in different legal systems (common vs. civil law).  
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Appendix 
Table A 7: Matrix: Defining the Research Gap 
 
NEW FIELD OF RESEARCH 
OLD FIELD OF 
RESEARCH 
NEW 
METHOD 
a) Developing a new model and applying 
it to new data! 
 DAX30 supervisory board 
remuneration data 
 New econometric model 
b) Developing a new model! 
 Remuneration data of 40 
Swedish large caps  
 New econometric model 
OLD 
METHOD 
c) Applying new data to an already 
tested framework! 
 DAX30 supervisory board 
remuneration data 
 Successful applied model of 
Oxelheim & Clarkson (2014) 
d) No empirical contribution! 
 Remuneration data of 40 
Swedish large caps 
 Same applied model as Oxelheim 
& Clarkson (2014) 
*Following Lars Oxelheim (2015) 
 
 
Table A 8: DAX30 Companies 
 
Adidas Deutsche Börse Lanxess
Allianz Deutsche Post Linde
BASF Deutsche Telekom Lufthansa
Bayer E.ON Merck
Beiersdorf Fresenius Münchener Rück
BMW Fresenius Medical Care RWE
Commerzbank Heidelberg Cement SAP
Continental Henkel Siemens
Daimler Infineon ThyssenKrupp
Deutsche Bank K+S Volkswagen
Dax 30 Companies (April 2015)
  X      
Table A 9: Pooled OLS Regression: Correlation Matrix 
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Chairman Compensation
1,00
CEO Compensation 
0,45 1,00
Academic
0,04 0,13 1,00
Additional directorships 
0,13 -0,13 -0,04 1,00
Age 
0,11 0,03 -0,10 0,03 1,00
External director with industry 
experience -0,04 0,10 0,12 -0,06 -0,08 1,00
Founder 
-0,07 0,03 -0,05 -0,31 0,05 -0,26 1,00
Gender 
-0,07 0,03 0,08 0,04 -0,24 -0,09 0,34 1,00
International education 
0,01 0,00 -0,28 0,18 -0,14 0,13 -0,30 -0,10 1,00
International experience 
0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,11 -0,02 0,08 -0,21 -0,10 -0,08 1,00
Previous executive 
0,19 -0,05 0,01 0,26 0,07 -0,52 -0,43 -0,14 0,09 -0,03 1,00
Substantial equity ownership 
0,11 0,20 -0,24 -0,24 -0,11 -0,17 0,33 0,51 0,07 -0,20 -0,04 1,00
Tenure
0,10 0,08 -0,05 -0,14 0,30 -0,02 0,27 -0,08 -0,05 -0,20 -0,12 0,07 1,00
Anglo American 
0,04 0,01 0,10 0,21 -0,17 -0,06 -0,13 -0,13 0,02 0,21 0,36 -0,26 -0,10 1,00
Board compensation
0,70 0,43 -0,04 0,06 0,14 -0,10 0,09 -0,07 0,02 -0,13 0,14 0,19 0,14 -0,01 1,00
Board size
0,28 0,17 0,01 0,03 -0,12 -0,01 -0,33 0,03 -0,05 0,04 0,39 0,11 -0,25 0,10 0,11 1,00
Busy 
0,12 0,04 0,14 0,02 0,14 0,01 -0,06 -0,31 -0,11 -0,14 0,12 -0,20 0,00 0,11 0,14 0,13 1,00
CEO tenure
-0,03 0,00 0,05 0,07 0,12 -0,01 0,09 -0,03 -0,12 0,14 -0,12 -0,04 0,23 0,05 -0,02 -0,36 -0,15 1,00
Financial industry knowledge 
0,08 0,14 0,11 0,08 0,03 -0,09 0,01 -0,09 -0,10 0,02 0,09 -0,14 0,00 0,13 -0,04 0,17 0,08 0,10 1,00
Internationals
-0,09 0,14 0,10 -0,08 0,00 -0,17 0,24 -0,06 0,03 0,10 0,08 -0,12 0,14 0,51 0,01 -0,39 0,00 0,25 0,22 1,00
No major shareholder 
-0,01 0,08 0,00 0,09 -0,04 -0,05 -0,14 -0,05 0,09 -0,11 0,03 -0,10 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,26 -0,03 0,13 0,03 0,17 1,00
Major shareholder
5-25% 0,16 0,08 0,09 -0,06 0,24 -0,11 -0,15 -0,17 -0,12 0,25 0,16 -0,17 0,00 0,04 0,13 0,16 0,06 -0,01 0,08 -0,15 -0,32 1,00
Major shareholder
25-50% -0,21 -0,21 0,03 0,13 -0,14 0,09 0,05 -0,07 0,02 -0,04 -0,10 -0,07 0,13 0,16 -0,19 -0,02 0,01 0,05 0,12 0,12 -0,15 -0,53 1,00
Variable compensation quotient
0,32 0,08 0,01 -0,18 0,06 0,00 0,14 -0,02 0,01 -0,29 -0,02 0,30 0,09 -0,37 0,30 0,05 0,02 -0,09 -0,15 -0,29 -0,01 -0,09 -0,21 1,00
Employees 
0,27 0,33 0,08 0,08 0,01 0,06 -0,01 -0,07 0,13 -0,08 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,21 0,22 0,28 0,15 -0,05 0,16 0,09 -0,07 -0,08 0,34 0,05 1,00
Investment activites
0,00 -0,11 -0,04 0,08 0,07 -0,04 -0,12 -0,09 -0,04 0,07 -0,03 -0,10 0,08 -0,07 -0,02 0,00 0,00 -0,13 -0,29 -0,34 -0,08 0,22 -0,01 0,11 0,08 1,00
Leverage
0,09 0,06 0,01 0,10 0,17 -0,05 0,07 -0,06 -0,29 -0,03 0,03 0,04 0,23 0,13 0,10 0,10 0,14 0,06 -0,02 -0,07 -0,17 -0,02 0,26 0,07 0,39 0,25 1,00
Risk
-0,27 -0,22 -0,11 -0,13 0,03 0,04 -0,13 -0,02 0,09 -0,02 -0,13 -0,02 -0,16 -0,19 -0,26 -0,10 0,04 -0,16 -0,27 -0,27 0,06 0,02 -0,09 -0,03 -0,25 0,27 -0,20 1,00
Sales
0,49 0,43 0,03 0,13 0,00 -0,02 -0,12 -0,07 0,03 0,03 0,27 0,09 -0,05 0,19 0,41 0,46 0,14 -0,10 0,14 0,03 -0,05 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,82 -0,01 0,28 -0,38 1,00
Size
0,38 0,33 0,03 0,14 -0,17 -0,05 -0,19 -0,10 -0,02 0,03 0,42 -0,03 -0,17 0,39 0,34 0,48 0,17 -0,08 0,29 0,22 0,05 -0,01 0,01 -0,13 0,37 -0,37 0,15 -0,47 0,67 1,00
Tangible Assets
0,10 -0,04 -0,06 0,15 0,22 0,10 -0,09 -0,09 -0,13 0,19 -0,09 -0,11 0,16 -0,05 0,03 0,06 0,02 -0,04 -0,25 -0,40 -0,17 0,23 0,01 0,10 0,08 0,71 0,23 0,28 0,04 -0,41 1,00
Tobin's q
-0,01 -0,01 0,07 -0,36 -0,07 0,20 0,22 0,10 0,11 -0,15 -0,34 0,17 0,04 -0,17 -0,01 -0,18 -0,01 -0,12 -0,12 -0,04 -0,09 0,11 -0,18 0,17 -0,08 -0,07 -0,33 0,10 -0,24 -0,41 -0,15 1,00
Crisis
-0,09 -0,10 0,12 0,03 0,00 -0,07 0,00 0,02 0,00 -0,07 0,07 0,01 -0,08 -0,01 -0,09 0,02 0,03 -0,04 0,09 0,00 -0,03 -0,09 0,08 0,01 0,00 -0,08 0,03 0,00 -0,01 0,01 -0,04 -0,13 1,00
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Chairman Compensation 1,00
CEO Compensation 0,39 1,00
Academic 0,10 0,00 1,00
Additional directorships 0,16 -0,04 -0,03 1,00
Age 0,06 0,11 -0,10 0,04 1,00
Gender -0,03 -0,01 0,08 0,04 -0,24 1,00
International education -0,04 0,14 -0,28 0,17 -0,14 -0,10 1,00
International experience 0,23 0,08 -0,01 0,10 -0,02 -0,10 -0,09 1,00
Previous executive 0,10 -0,10 0,01 0,25 0,07 -0,15 0,08 -0,04 1,00
Substantial equity ownership -0,27 -0,02 -0,24 -0,25 -0,11 0,51 0,07 -0,20 -0,04 1,00
Tenure 0,00 0,03 -0,05 -0,15 0,30 -0,08 -0,05 -0,20 -0,13 0,07 1,00
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Board compensation -0,08 0,04 -0,14 0,03 0,08 -0,03 0,11 -0,06 0,09 0,25 0,06 -0,06 1,00
Board size 0,15 0,22 0,01 0,03 -0,12 0,03 -0,05 0,04 0,39 0,10 -0,25 0,10 0,07 1,00
Busy 0,06 0,02 0,14 0,03 0,14 -0,31 -0,11 -0,14 0,12 -0,20 0,00 0,12 0,06 0,13 1,00
CEO tenure 0,06 -0,06 0,05 0,08 0,12 -0,03 -0,12 0,14 -0,12 -0,04 0,23 0,05 -0,06 -0,36 -0,15 1,00
Financial industry knowledge 0,22 0,19 0,12 0,06 0,04 -0,09 -0,11 0,02 0,08 -0,14 -0,01 0,13 -0,11 0,17 0,08 0,10 1,00
Internationals 0,20 0,07 0,10 -0,06 0,00 -0,06 0,04 0,10 0,08 -0,12 0,15 0,51 -0,05 -0,39 0,00 0,25 0,23 1,00
No major shareholder 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,08 -0,04 -0,05 0,09 -0,11 0,03 -0,10 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,26 -0,03 0,13 0,03 0,17 1,00
Major shareholder
5-25% 
0,24 0,10 0,09 -0,08 0,24 -0,17 -0,12 0,24 0,16 -0,18 -0,01 0,04 -0,04 0,16 0,06 -0,01 0,08 -0,15 -0,33 1,00
Major shareholder
25-50% 
-0,04 -0,08 0,04 0,13 -0,14 -0,07 0,02 -0,04 -0,10 -0,07 0,13 0,16 0,06 -0,02 0,01 0,05 0,11 0,12 -0,15 -0,53 1,00
Variable compensation quotient -0,58 -0,15 0,01 -0,17 0,06 -0,02 0,01 -0,28 -0,02 0,31 0,10 -0,37 0,20 0,05 0,02 -0,10 -0,14 -0,29 -0,01 -0,09 -0,21 1,00
Employees 0,07 0,32 0,02 0,12 -0,03 -0,10 0,30 0,00 0,16 0,20 0,05 0,28 0,18 0,35 0,15 -0,04 0,19 0,12 -0,11 -0,12 0,30 0,03 1,00
Investment activites -0,16 -0,05 -0,04 0,07 0,07 -0,09 -0,04 0,06 -0,04 -0,11 0,08 -0,07 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,13 -0,30 -0,34 -0,08 0,22 -0,01 0,11 -0,01 1,00
Leverage -0,09 -0,06 0,01 0,10 0,17 -0,06 -0,29 -0,03 0,03 0,04 0,22 0,13 0,11 0,10 0,14 0,06 -0,03 -0,07 -0,17 -0,02 0,26 0,07 0,24 0,25 1,00
Risk -0,16 -0,05 -0,12 -0,09 0,02 -0,01 0,10 -0,01 -0,12 -0,02 -0,16 -0,18 -0,08 -0,10 0,04 -0,17 -0,26 -0,29 0,07 0,03 -0,09 -0,05 -0,19 0,28 -0,20 1,00
Sales (ln) 0,25 0,33 -0,13 0,13 0,02 -0,11 0,14 0,08 0,31 0,21 -0,01 0,23 0,27 0,37 0,15 -0,07 0,10 0,16 -0,01 0,02 -0,04 0,09 0,68 -0,04 0,21 -0,27 1,00
Size (ln) 0,28 0,00 0,04 0,10 -0,31 -0,07 0,04 -0,03 0,25 -0,06 -0,15 0,31 0,03 0,18 0,14 -0,08 0,20 0,18 0,10 -0,06 -0,07 -0,18 0,03 -0,38 -0,02 -0,26 0,27 1,00
Tangible Assets -0,04 0,06 -0,06 0,15 0,23 -0,09 -0,13 0,18 -0,09 -0,11 0,16 -0,05 0,01 0,06 0,02 -0,04 -0,26 -0,40 -0,17 0,22 0,01 0,10 -0,03 0,71 0,23 0,29 0,02 -0,46 1,00
Tobin's q -0,08 -0,08 0,07 -0,37 -0,07 0,10 0,11 -0,15 -0,34 0,17 0,04 -0,17 -0,05 -0,18 -0,01 -0,12 -0,12 -0,04 -0,09 0,11 -0,18 0,18 -0,01 -0,07 -0,33 0,10 -0,24 -0,25 -0,15 1,00
Crisis -0,10 -0,09 0,12 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,00 -0,08 0,07 0,01 -0,08 -0,02 0,03 0,02 0,04 -0,04 0,09 0,01 -0,03 -0,09 0,08 0,02 -0,02 -0,08 0,03 0,01 -0,04 0,01 -0,05 -0,13 1
Table A 10 : Fixed Effects OLS Regression: Correlation Matrix 
Table A 11:Fixed Effects Regression Fixed compensation: Correlation Matrix 
  XII      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A 11:Fixed Effects Regression Fixed compensation: Correlation Matrix 
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Fixed chairman compensation
1,00
Fixed CEO Compensation 
0,39 1,00
Academic
0,10 0,00 1,00
Additional directorships 
0,16 -0,04 -0,03 1,00
Age 
0,06 0,11 -0,10 0,04 1,00
Gender 
-0,03 -0,01 0,08 0,04 -0,24 1,00
International education 
-0,04 0,14 -0,28 0,17 -0,14 -0,10 1,00
International experience 
0,23 0,08 -0,01 0,10 -0,02 -0,10 -0,09 1,00
Previous executive 
0,10 -0,10 0,01 0,25 0,07 -0,15 0,08 -0,04 1,00
Substantial equity ownership 
-0,27 -0,02 -0,24 -0,25 -0,11 0,51 0,07 -0,20 -0,04 1,00
Tenure
0,00 0,03 -0,05 -0,15 0,30 -0,08 -0,05 -0,20 -0,13 0,07 1,00
Anglo American 
0,32 0,01 0,10 0,20 -0,17 -0,13 0,02 0,20 0,35 -0,27 -0,10 1,00
Board compensation
-0,08 0,04 -0,14 0,03 0,08 -0,03 0,11 -0,06 0,09 0,25 0,06 -0,06 1,00
Board size
0,15 0,22 0,01 0,03 -0,12 0,03 -0,05 0,04 0,39 0,10 -0,25 0,10 0,07 1,00
Busy 
0,06 0,02 0,14 0,03 0,14 -0,31 -0,11 -0,14 0,12 -0,20 0,00 0,12 0,06 0,13 1,00
CEO tenure
0,06 -0,06 0,05 0,08 0,12 -0,03 -0,12 0,14 -0,12 -0,04 0,23 0,05 -0,06 -0,36 -0,15 1,00
Financial industry knowledge 
0,22 0,19 0,12 0,06 0,04 -0,09 -0,11 0,02 0,08 -0,14 -0,01 0,13 -0,11 0,17 0,08 0,10 1,00
Internationals
0,20 0,07 0,10 -0,06 0,00 -0,06 0,04 0,10 0,08 -0,12 0,15 0,51 -0,05 -0,39 0,00 0,25 0,23 1,00
No major shareholder 
0,00 0,06 0,00 0,08 -0,04 -0,05 0,09 -0,11 0,03 -0,10 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,26 -0,03 0,13 0,03 0,17 1,00
Major shareholder
5-25% 0,24 0,10 0,09 -0,08 0,24 -0,17 -0,12 0,24 0,16 -0,18 -0,01 0,04 -0,04 0,16 0,06 -0,01 0,08 -0,15 -0,33 1,00
Major shareholder
25-50% -0,04 -0,08 0,04 0,13 -0,14 -0,07 0,02 -0,04 -0,10 -0,07 0,13 0,16 0,06 -0,02 0,01 0,05 0,11 0,12 -0,15 -0,53 1,00
Variable compensation quotient
-0,58 -0,15 0,01 -0,17 0,06 -0,02 0,01 -0,28 -0,02 0,31 0,10 -0,37 0,20 0,05 0,02 -0,10 -0,14 -0,29 -0,01 -0,09 -0,21 1,00
Employees 
0,07 0,32 0,02 0,12 -0,03 -0,10 0,30 0,00 0,16 0,20 0,05 0,28 0,18 0,35 0,15 -0,04 0,19 0,12 -0,11 -0,12 0,30 0,03 1,00
Investment activites
-0,16 -0,05 -0,04 0,07 0,07 -0,09 -0,04 0,06 -0,04 -0,11 0,08 -0,07 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,13 -0,30 -0,34 -0,08 0,22 -0,01 0,11 -0,01 1,00
Leverage
-0,09 -0,06 0,01 0,10 0,17 -0,06 -0,29 -0,03 0,03 0,04 0,22 0,13 0,11 0,10 0,14 0,06 -0,03 -0,07 -0,17 -0,02 0,26 0,07 0,24 0,25 1,00
Risk
-0,16 -0,05 -0,12 -0,09 0,02 -0,01 0,10 -0,01 -0,12 -0,02 -0,16 -0,18 -0,08 -0,10 0,04 -0,17 -0,26 -0,29 0,07 0,03 -0,09 -0,05 -0,19 0,28 -0,20 1,00
Sales
0,25 0,33 -0,13 0,13 0,02 -0,11 0,14 0,08 0,31 0,21 -0,01 0,23 0,27 0,37 0,15 -0,07 0,10 0,16 -0,01 0,02 -0,04 0,09 0,68 -0,04 0,21 -0,27 1,00
Size
0,28 0,00 0,04 0,10 -0,31 -0,07 0,04 -0,03 0,25 -0,06 -0,15 0,31 0,03 0,18 0,14 -0,08 0,20 0,18 0,10 -0,06 -0,07 -0,18 0,03 -0,38 -0,02 -0,26 0,27 1,00
Tangible Assets
-0,04 0,06 -0,06 0,15 0,23 -0,09 -0,13 0,18 -0,09 -0,11 0,16 -0,05 0,01 0,06 0,02 -0,04 -0,26 -0,40 -0,17 0,22 0,01 0,10 -0,03 0,71 0,23 0,29 0,02 -0,46 1,00
Tobin's q
-0,08 -0,08 0,07 -0,37 -0,07 0,10 0,11 -0,15 -0,34 0,17 0,04 -0,17 -0,05 -0,18 -0,01 -0,12 -0,12 -0,04 -0,09 0,11 -0,18 0,18 -0,01 -0,07 -0,33 0,10 -0,24 -0,25 -0,15 1,00
Crisis
-0,10 -0,09 0,12 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,00 -0,08 0,07 0,01 -0,08 -0,02 0,03 0,02 0,04 -0,04 0,09 0,01 -0,03 -0,09 0,08 0,02 -0,02 -0,08 0,03 0,01 -0,04 0,01 -0,05 -0,13 1,00
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Table A 12 Fixed Effects Regression Variable compensation: Correlation Matrix 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 c
h
ai
rm
an
 
co
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
V
ar
ia
b
le
 C
E
O
 
C
o
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
 
A
ca
d
em
ic
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
h
ip
s 
A
g
e 
G
en
d
er
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
P
re
v
io
u
s 
ex
ec
u
ti
v
e 
S
u
b
st
an
ti
al
 e
q
u
it
y
 
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
 
T
en
u
re
A
n
g
lo
 A
m
er
ic
an
 
B
o
ar
d
 c
o
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
B
o
ar
d
 s
iz
e
B
u
sy
 
C
E
O
 t
en
u
re
F
in
an
ci
al
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
s
N
o
 m
aj
o
r 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
 
M
aj
o
r 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
5
-2
5
%
 
M
aj
o
r 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
2
5
-5
0
%
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 c
o
m
p
en
sa
ti
o
n
 
q
u
o
ti
en
t
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s
L
ev
er
ag
e
R
is
k
S
al
es
S
iz
e
T
o
b
in
's
 q
C
ri
si
s
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s
T
an
g
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
Variable chairman compensation
1,00
Variable CEO compensation
0,15 1,00
Academic
0,17 0,10 1,00
Additional directorships 
-0,12 -0,05 -0,04 1,00
Age 
0,03 -0,06 -0,11 0,02 1,00
Gender 
-0,07 0,02 0,08 0,04 -0,24 1,00
International education 
-0,04 -0,05 -0,26 0,18 -0,13 -0,10 1,00
International experience 
-0,33 -0,04 -0,01 0,11 -0,02 -0,10 -0,08 1,00
Previous executive 
0,07 -0,02 0,02 0,26 0,07 -0,15 0,08 -0,04 1,00
Substantial equity ownership 
0,13 0,07 -0,24 -0,24 -0,11 0,50 0,07 -0,20 -0,04 1,00
Tenure
0,09 0,06 -0,05 -0,15 0,30 -0,07 -0,05 -0,19 -0,10 0,08 1,00
Anglo American 
-0,19 0,07 0,10 0,20 -0,18 -0,13 0,03 0,22 0,39 -0,26 -0,14 1,00
Board compensation
0,09 0,06 -0,15 0,03 0,09 -0,03 0,11 -0,06 0,09 0,25 0,07 -0,06 1,00
Board size
-0,04 0,08 0,02 0,05 -0,11 0,03 -0,07 0,01 0,38 0,10 -0,20 0,17 0,06 1,00
Busy 
0,14 -0,03 0,13 0,03 0,13 -0,32 -0,10 -0,15 0,12 -0,21 0,01 0,12 0,06 0,14 1,00
CEO tenure
-0,06 0,08 0,05 0,07 0,14 -0,03 -0,12 0,15 -0,11 -0,03 0,23 0,03 -0,05 -0,37 -0,14 1,00
Financial industry knowledge 
0,00 0,16 0,10 0,08 0,02 -0,09 -0,09 0,03 0,09 -0,14 -0,01 0,13 -0,10 0,20 0,06 0,11 1,00
Internationals
-0,09 0,10 0,08 -0,10 -0,03 -0,06 0,08 0,14 0,14 -0,11 0,09 0,50 -0,05 -0,30 -0,02 0,25 0,21 1,00
No major shareholder 
0,08 0,04 0,00 0,09 -0,04 -0,05 0,09 -0,12 0,03 -0,10 -0,01 0,01 -0,03 -0,29 -0,04 0,14 0,03 0,20 1,00
Major shareholder
5-25% -0,17 -0,06 0,10 -0,06 0,24 -0,18 -0,13 0,24 0,14 -0,18 0,03 0,07 -0,05 0,12 0,05 0,01 0,09 -0,10 -0,33 1,00
Major shareholder
25-50% -0,06 -0,01 0,03 0,12 -0,15 -0,07 0,03 -0,01 -0,06 -0,06 0,07 0,12 0,08 0,09 0,02 0,01 0,12 0,02 -0,14 -0,51 1,00
Variable compensation quotient
0,73 0,13 0,01 -0,18 0,07 -0,03 0,01 -0,31 -0,04 0,30 0,13 -0,37 0,20 -0,01 0,02 -0,09 -0,14 -0,27 -0,02 -0,12 -0,18 1,00
Investment activities
0,00 -0,02 -0,04 0,08 0,07 -0,09 -0,04 0,06 -0,04 -0,10 0,09 -0,07 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,13 -0,29 -0,36 -0,08 0,22 -0,01 0,10 1,00
Leverage
-0,04 0,08 0,00 0,10 0,17 -0,05 -0,29 -0,02 0,05 0,05 0,21 0,11 0,11 0,16 0,14 0,05 -0,03 -0,14 -0,17 0,01 0,23 0,09 0,25 1,00
Risk
-0,05 -0,33 -0,11 -0,13 0,03 -0,02 0,09 -0,03 -0,14 -0,03 -0,14 -0,18 -0,08 -0,14 0,04 -0,16 -0,27 -0,27 0,06 0,01 -0,07 -0,05 0,26 -0,19 1,00
Sales
0,00 0,17 -0,14 0,15 0,03 -0,11 0,15 0,07 0,31 0,21 0,01 0,25 0,27 0,35 0,15 -0,06 0,11 0,22 -0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,07 -0,04 0,23 -0,29 1,00
Size
-0,12 0,07 0,04 0,11 -0,31 -0,07 0,04 -0,03 0,25 -0,06 -0,15 0,32 0,03 0,17 0,14 -0,08 0,21 0,21 0,09 -0,06 -0,05 -0,20 -0,38 -0,01 -0,27 0,27 1,00
Tobin's q
0,15 0,00 0,06 -0,36 -0,08 0,10 0,12 -0,15 -0,34 0,17 0,04 -0,18 -0,06 -0,20 -0,02 -0,13 -0,12 -0,05 -0,09 0,11 -0,19 0,18 -0,07 -0,34 0,10 -0,24 -0,25 1,00
Crisis
0,07 -0,11 0,13 0,03 0,00 0,02 -0,01 -0,08 0,06 0,01 -0,07 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,03 -0,03 0,09 0,03 -0,04 -0,10 0,11 0,01 -0,08 0,04 0,00 -0,05 0,01 -0,14 1,00
Employees
0,00 0,11 0,01 0,13 -0,03 -0,10 0,32 0,00 0,16 0,20 0,05 0,28 0,18 0,37 0,15 -0,04 0,19 0,13 -0,11 -0,12 0,32 0,03 0,00 0,25 -0,19 0,68 0,03 -0,01 -0,01 1,00
Tangible Assets
-0,05 0,00 -0,05 0,15 0,24 -0,09 -0,14 0,18 -0,10 -0,11 0,17 -0,05 0,01 0,04 0,03 -0,05 -0,25 -0,41 -0,17 0,23 0,02 0,09 0,71 0,24 0,28 0,02 -0,46 -0,15 -0,04 -0,02 1,00
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Table A 13: Fixed Effects OLS Regression: Descriptive Statistics 
 M
ea
n
 M
ed
ia
n
 M
ax
im
u
m
 M
in
im
u
m
 S
td
. 
D
ev
.
 S
k
ew
n
es
s
 K
u
rt
o
si
s
 J
ar
q
u
e-
B
er
a
 P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 S
u
m
 S
u
m
 S
q
. 
D
ev
.
 O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
Chairman Compensation 11,84 11,98 14,12 9,55 0,75095 -0,55992 3,74320 19,26819 0,00007 3.029,94 143,80 256
CEO Compensation 14,24 14,23 15,95 12,71 0,55245 -0,10401 3,16731 0,76014 0,68382 3.645,75 77,83 256
Academic 0,78 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,41684 -1,33329 2,77766 76,37414 0,00000 199,00 44,31 256
Additional directorships 0,93 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,24948 -3,48281 13,12995 1.612,11500 0,00000 239,00 15,87 256
Age 0,71 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,45602 -0,90978 1,82770 49,97423 0,00000 181,00 53,03 256
Gender 0,02 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,15159 6,30005 40,69067 16.846,39000 0,00000 6,00 5,86 256
International education 0,30 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,45950 0,86882 1,75484 48,74440 0,00000 77,00 53,84 256
International experience 0,29 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,45602 0,90978 1,82770 49,97423 0,00000 75,00 53,03 256
Previous executive 0,47 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,50000 0,12525 1,01569 42,66929 0,00000 120,00 63,75 256
Substantial equity ownership 0,09 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,28082 2,95472 9,73038 855,67520 0,00000 22,00 20,11 256
Tenure 5,09 5,00 19,00 1,00 3,25523 1,13560 4,95456 95,77239 0,00000 1.302,00 2.702,11 256
Anglo American 0,43 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,49600 0,28407 1,08070 42,73613 0,00000 110,00 62,73 256
Board compensation 148142,10 117424,30 4574665,00 7500,00 287670,70 14,34 220,76 514.566,70000 0,00000 38 Mio. 21 100 000 Mio. 256
Board size 16,84 20,00 21,00 6,00 3,92066 -0,92487 2,86127 36,70182 0,00000 4.312,00 3.919,75 256
Busy 0,86 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,34422 -2,11487 5,47266 256,04970 0,00000 221,00 30,21 256
CEO tenure 5,03 5,00 16,00 1,00 2,99333 0,65832 3,04449 18,51219 0,00010 1.287,00 2.284,81 256
Financial industry knowledge 0,75 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,43610 -1,13083 2,27878 60,10952 0,00000 191,00 48,50 256
Internationals 0,12 0,09 0,50 0,00 0,12180 1,33465 4,50786 100,25360 0,00000 31,73 3,78 256
No major shareholder 0,09 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,28652 2,86865 9,22915 765,00120 0,00000 23,00 20,93 256
Major shareholder
5-25% 
0,56 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,49753 -0,23600 1,05570 42,69976 0,00000 143,00 63,12 256
Major shareholder
25-50% 
0,18 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,38791 1,63453 3,67169 118,80450 0,00000 47,00 38,37 256
Variable compensation quotient 0,34 0,29 0,95 0,00 0,32435 0,34846 1,62756 25,27232 0,00000 85,91 26,83 256
Employees 126621,20 82858,50 592586,00 2966,00 128425,70 1,71636 5,34058 184,12680 0,00000 32.415.015,00 4 210 000 Mio. 256
Investment activites 0,04 0,04 0,20 0,00 0,03489 1,60325 7,07403 286,71330 0,00000 10,87 0 256
Leverage 0,24 0,23 0,61 0,00 0,13882 0,23427 2,50774 4,92632 0,08517 62,40 4,91 256
Risk 2,71 1,79 23,75 0,10 3,45619 3,18409 15,72924 2.160,93000 0,00000 693,60 3.046,04 256
Sales 4 150 Mio. 3 010 Mio. 20 200 Mio. 200 Mio. 3 810 Mio. 1,38638 5,31095 138,97190 0,00000 1 060 000 Mio. 37 Mio. (+ 15 E) 256
Size 172 Mio. 419 Mio. 2 190 Mio. 2778908,00 365 Mio. 3,74625 17,75352 2 920 Mio. 0,00000 43 900 Mio. 34 Mio. (+21 E) 256
Tangible Assets 0,21 0,20 0,54 0,00 0,14105 0,16216 2,15330 8,76891 0,01247 54,08 5,07 256
Tobin's q 1,48 1,22 5,56 0,85 0,72346 2,47827 10,21215 816,87990 0,00000 379,73 133,47 256
Crisis 0,45 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,49797 0,22007 1,04843 42,69169 0,00000 114,00 63,23 256
Variable chairman 
copensation
-0,56 10,96 14,08079 -27,63102 18,13951 -0,81929 1,68636 46,49485 0,00000 -141,94 82918,53 253
Variable CEO compensation 14,34 14,77 16,56086 -32,23619 4,25240 -10,44783 114,65470 136023,50000 0,00000 3627,23 4556,89 253
Fixed chairman compensation 11,85 11,98 14,11747 9,54681 0,75257 -0,59314 3,77390 21,14822 0,00003 2997,17 142,72 253
Fixed CEO compensation 14,25 14,24 15,95072 12,70681 0,54678 -0,13176 3,28139 1,56677 0,45686 3604,19 75,34 253
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Table A 14: Redundant Fixed Effects Test (CSU) 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.720011 (29,198) 0.0168 
Cross-section Chi-square 57.742509 29 0.0012 
     
          
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: CHAIRMAN_COMPENSATION  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/08/15   Time: 09:53   
Sample: 2006 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 257  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CEO_COMPENSATION 0.138687 0.061923 2.239676 0.0261 
CM_ACADEMIC 0.083030 0.072752 1.141260 0.2550 
CM_ADDITIONAL_DIRECTORSH 0.324961 0.110449 2.942174 0.0036 
CM_AGE 0.074222 0.066639 1.113790 0.2665 
CM_INTERNATIONAL_EDUCATI 0.046174 0.060128 0.767932 0.4433 
CM_INTERNATIONAL_EXPERIE 0.122372 0.079296 1.543235 0.1242 
CM_SUBSTANTIAL_EQUITY_OW -0.008710 0.113572 -0.076692 0.9389 
CM_TENURE 0.022465 0.011527 1.948959 0.0525 
CG_ANGLO_AMERICAN 0.120389 0.088181 1.365257 0.1735 
CG_BOARD_COMPENSATION 0.427311 0.091952 4.647083 0.0000 
CG_BOARD_SIZE 0.012319 0.008580 1.435759 0.1524 
CG_BUSY -0.021630 0.073404 -0.294675 0.7685 
CG_CEO_TENURE 0.007215 0.009491 0.760172 0.4479 
CG_FINANCIAL_INDUSTRY_KN 0.127978 0.068150 1.877887 0.0617 
CG_INTERNATIONALS -0.523825 0.298276 -1.756175 0.0804 
CG_MAJOR_SH_25_50_ -0.003248 0.114467 -0.028374 0.9774 
CG_MAJOR_SH_5_25_ -0.040293 0.064936 -0.620505 0.5355 
CG_NO_MAJOR_SH 0.077711 0.086769 0.895604 0.3714 
CG_VARIABLE_COMPENSATION 0.355796 0.101515 3.504871 0.0006 
FC_EMPLOYEES -0.146535 0.063672 -2.301405 0.0223 
FC_INVESTMENT_ACTIVITIES 0.140951 0.925369 0.152319 0.8791 
FC_LEVERAGE -0.003536 0.265660 -0.013309 0.9894 
FC_RISK 0.005752 0.009336 0.616168 0.5384 
FC_SALES 0.189840 0.065281 2.908048 0.0040 
FC_SIZE 0.052136 0.044503 1.171516 0.2426 
FC_TANGIBLE_ASSETS 0.369835 0.338132 1.093757 0.2752 
FC_TOBIN_S_Q 0.167153 0.058087 2.877643 0.0044 
CRISIS -0.006533 0.047146 -0.138560 0.8899 
CM_GENDER -0.003162 0.174024 -0.018173 0.9855 
C 0.611722 0.822430 0.743799 0.4578 
     
     R-squared 0.662631    Mean dependent var 12.42045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.619531    S.D. dependent var 0.604906 
S.E. of regression 0.373119    Akaike info criterion 0.975498 
Sum squared resid 31.60242    Schwarz criterion 1.389787 
Log likelihood -95.35147    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.142104 
F-statistic 15.37426    Durbin-Watson stat 1.917978 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
  
   XVI 
     
Table A 15: Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 51.596244 28 0.0043 
     
      
Table A 16: Backwards tested Chairman compensation 
Dependent Variable: CHAIRMAN_COMPENSATION  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 10:31   
Sample: 2006 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 258  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CEO_COMPENSATION 0.364262 0.074791 4.870402 0.0000 
CM_ACADEMIC 0.185167 0.085329 2.170031 0.0311 
CG_ANGLO_AMERICAN 0.188480 0.108557 1.736231 0.0839 
CG_BOARD_SIZE -0.029590 0.017125 -1.727914 0.0854 
CG_VARIABLE_COMPENSATION 0.388383 0.130640 2.972924 0.0033 
FC_LEVERAGE -1.220740 0.458671 -2.661473 0.0084 
CRISIS -0.100112 0.054813 -1.826422 0.0691 
C 7.348968 1.222090 6.013444 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.635628    Mean dependent var 12.42147 
Adjusted R-squared 0.576273    S.D. dependent var 0.603948 
S.E. of regression 0.393136    Akaike info criterion 1.102700 
Sum squared resid 34.15678    Schwarz criterion 1.612233 
Log likelihood -105.2483    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.307586 
F-statistic 10.70896    Durbin-Watson stat 2.037358 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A 17:Backwards tested Fixed chairman compensation 
Dependent Variable: LOGGED_FIXED_CHAIRMAN_CO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 11:47   
Sample: 2006 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 259  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LOGGED_FIXED_CEO_COMPEN
S 0.337723 0.082032 4.116969 0.0001 
CM_ACADEMIC 0.258018 0.084000 3.071631 0.0024 
CM_INTERNATIONAL_EDUCAT
I 0.065789 0.097149 0.677195 0.4990 
CM_TENURE 0.028047 0.011673 2.402672 0.0171 
CG_INTERNATIONALS 0.248392 0.632129 0.392946 0.6947 
CG_MAJOR_SH_5_25_ -0.164369 0.085285 -1.927289 0.0552 
CG_VARIABLE_COMPENSATIO
N -1.526350 0.154200 -9.898487 0.0000 
CRISIS -0.138290 0.057752 -2.394568 0.0175 
C 7.302627 1.127852 6.474808 0.0000 
     
     Effects Specification 
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
     
     R-squared 0.719630    Mean dependent var 11.84260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.672690    S.D. dependent var 0.749545 
S.E. of regression 0.428823    Akaike info criterion 1.279224 
Sum squared resid 40.63944    Schwarz criterion 1.801075 
Log likelihood -127.6595    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.489039 
F-statistic 15.33088    Durbin-Watson stat 1.451646 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Dependent Variable: LOGGED_FIXED_CHAIRMAN_CO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 11:51   
Sample: 2006 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 259  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LOGGED_FIXED_CEO_COMP
ENS 0.344526 0.078350 4.397243 0.0000 
CM_ACADEMIC 0.243191 0.080667 3.014749 0.0029 
CM_TENURE 0.028644 0.011634 2.462071 0.0146 
CG_MAJOR_SH_5_25_ -0.151786 0.083330 -1.821514 0.0699 
CG_VARIABLE_COMPENSATI
ON -1.538410 0.145349 -10.58427 0.0000 
CRISIS -0.133308 0.055489 -2.402443 0.0171 
C 7.259217 1.100059 6.598933 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.718954    Mean dependent var 11.84260 
Adjusted R-squared 0.674843    S.D. dependent var 0.749545 
S.E. of regression 0.427409    Akaike info criterion 1.266188 
Sum squared resid 40.73739    Schwarz criterion 1.760573 
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Log likelihood -127.9713    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.464960 
F-statistic 16.29896    Durbin-Watson stat 1.452903 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A 18: Backwards tested Variable chairman compensation 
Dependent Variable: LOGGED_VARIABLE_CHAIRMAN  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 11:55   
Sample: 2006 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 263  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CM_ACADEMIC 8.052012 4.210006 1.912589 0.0571 
CM_GENDER -29.93828 9.235323 -3.241714 0.0014 
CG_BUSY 3.826066 3.366117 1.136641 0.2569 
CG_FINANCIAL_INDUSTRY_KN 8.331966 2.665399 3.125974 0.0020 
CG_MAJOR_SH_5_25_ -10.72293 3.272455 -3.276725 0.0012 
CG_MAJOR_SH_25_50_ -13.73121 4.608712 -2.979402 0.0032 
FC_LEVERAGE 19.40277 15.55392 1.247451 0.2135 
FC_TOBIN_S_Q 10.48768 2.884399 3.636001 0.0003 
CRISIS 2.858395 1.799277 1.588635 0.1136 
C -28.67422 9.445373 -3.035795 0.0027 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.547490    Mean dependent var -0.729670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.470725    S.D. dependent var 18.17225 
S.E. of regression 13.22054    Akaike info criterion 8.137490 
Sum squared resid 39151.32    Schwarz criterion 8.667201 
Log likelihood -1031.080    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.350369 
F-statistic 7.132027    Durbin-Watson stat 1.983595 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Dependent Variable: LOGGED_VARIABLE_CHAIRMAN  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/26/15   Time: 11:56   
Sample: 2006 2014   
Periods included: 9   
Cross-sections included: 30   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 263  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     CM_ACADEMIC 8.805529 4.109434 2.142760 0.0332 
CM_GENDER -30.31704 9.513366 -3.186784 0.0016 
CG_FINANCIAL_INDUSTRY_KN 8.951394 2.668858 3.354016 0.0009 
CG_MAJOR_SH_5_25_ -12.02811 3.303844 -3.640641 0.0003 
CG_MAJOR_SH_25_50_ -14.17729 4.513180 -3.141308 0.0019 
FC_TOBIN_S_Q 8.167171 2.554021 3.197770 0.0016 
C -16.20892 6.598334 -2.456517 0.0148 
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 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.534950    Mean dependent var -0.729670 
Adjusted R-squared 0.463246    S.D. dependent var 18.17225 
S.E. of regression 13.31362    Akaike info criterion 8.142012 
Sum squared resid 40236.31    Schwarz criterion 8.630976 
Log likelihood -1034.675    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.338515 
F-statistic 7.460562    Durbin-Watson stat 1.961318 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
